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NOTE
THE FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY ACT-THE PROBLEM
OF SEPARATELY PUNISHABLE OFFENSES
The Federal Bank Robbery Act' provides a comprehensive
scheme for prosecuting and penalizing those who steal from a federally insured bank. The Act encompasses the underlying crimes of
entering with felonious intent, robbery, petit and grand larceny, and
receiving property stolen from a bank. In addition, the Act has
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970). The Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to
take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other
thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or
possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit
union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank,
credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof,
so used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan
association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larcenyShall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the
care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or
any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; or
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property
or money or any other thing of value not exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the
care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or
any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(c) Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of,
any property or money or other thing of value knowing the same to have been
taken from a bank, credit union, or a savings and loan association, in violation
of subsection (b) of this section shall be subject to the punishment provided by
said subsection (b) for the taker.
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined
in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy
the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
(e) Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding
or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense, or in
freeing himself or attempting to free himself from arrest or confinement for such
offense, kills any person, or forces any person to accompany him without the
consent of such person, shall be imprisoned not less than ten years, or punished
by death if the verdict of the jury shall so direct.
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provisions directed toward accompanying aggravated circumstances
including assault, jeopardizing lives by means of a dangerous
weapon, kidnapping, and homicide. The Act establishes penalties
for each step of the offense culminating in a maximum of life imprisonment.' The failure of the Supreme Court3 to delineate the precise
scope4 of the Act has left doubtful whether certain subsections create separately punishable offenses. Asserting that the Act creates
merely one offense with alternative means of commission, many
courts nevertheless have imposed multiple penalties for each of the
various subsections of the Act. In Prince v. United States,' the Supreme Court sought to resolve the issue of multiple penalties, striking down pyramided sentences imposed under certain subsections'
of the Act. Courts, however, often have ignored or misapplied this
decision and have persistently imposed illegal multiple sentences.'
Further conflict is evidenced by the differing methods for curing
such incorrect sentences and by the opposing views of whether the
Act proscribes multiple convictions as well as multiple sentences.
This confusion and disagreement demonstrates a need for a thor2. The Solicitor General conceded that the provision in the Act for the death penalty upon
direction of the jury is a constitutionally impermissible infringement upon the right to trial
by jury. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated and remanded, 392 U.S.
651 (1968). Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (similar provision in Federal
Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970), held unconstitutional; this case was the basis
for the concession in Pope).
3. United States v. Gaddis, 96 S. Ct. 1023 (1976); Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301
(1961); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322
(1957).
4. See United States v. Gaddis, 96 S. Ct. 1023 (1976), in which it is noted in the concurring
opinion that "district judges have nonetheless made mistakes and there is no reason to believe
that the mistakes will completely cease just because the Court today reiterates the correct
instructions." Id. at 1028 n.* (White, J., concurring).
5. 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
6. Id. at 327. Prince was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for robbery and received a
consecutive 15 year sentence for entering the bank with felonious intent under subsections
(a), (b), and (d).
7. Illustrative of this failure to heed the Prince mandate, as to sentencing, is Kelsey v.
United States, 484 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1973), in which the appellate court quoted a colloquy
between the district judge and defense counsel as to the permissible penalties under the
statute:
The Court: Do you know on each of those counts [(a), (b) and (d)] . . . you
could be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 20 years . . ..
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I believe it is 20 years on the first two counts [10
on the third] and 25 years on the fourth . . . a total of 75 years. The Court: All
right, I stand corrected.
Id. at 1199 n.3.
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ough examination of the Federal Bank Robbery Act to determine its
correct interpretation and application. Through consideration of
double jeopardy implications, statutory construction, and probable
adverse collateral consequences engendered by multiple convictions
or sentences, this Note will present a proper interpretation of the
Act and a desirable method for its implementation in both the indictment and the sentencing stages of prosecution.
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF COURTS

To

MULTIPLY OFFENSES UNDER

THE ACT

Courts are uncertain about the consequences of a course of conduct violative of more than one provision of the Act; a single robbery
of a federally insured bank conceivably could comprehend violations of every subsection. A person could enter the bank with intent
to commit robbery,' rob the teller at gunpoint,9 walk out of the bank
with over $100,11 kidnap or kill a bystander in the course of the
robbery," and later dispose of the proceeds.' 2 As each subsection of
the Act carries its own separate penalty, such a person theoretically
could be convicted under each subsection, with a potential consecutive sentence of over 100 years.
Generally, when such potential for multiple conviction and cumulative sentencing exists, two factors have operated to limit unjust
results: the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy,'"
and the intent of Congress, when ascertainable, in enacting the
criminal statute. The double jeopardy clause of the Constitution not
only bars retrial of the same offense after a person has been put in
"jeopardy" for a given crime, but also bars multiple punishments
for the same offense. 4 The need for a just and workable definition
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970).
9. Id. § 2113(d).
10. Id.§ 2113(b).
11. Id.§ 2113(e).
12. Id.§ 2113(c).
13. "No person shall be ... subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
life or limb ....
14. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
In Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941), the Supreme Court stated in dictum that
"[tlhe erroneous imposition of two sentences for a single offense of which the accused has
been convicted . . . does not constitute double jeopardy." Id. at 349. This statement flatly
contradicts the Court's earlier statement in Lange that "the Constitution was designed as
much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as from being
twice tried for it." 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873). It is surprising that so few courts have
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of "same offense" is an inherent problem in this latter prohibition.
Courts, struggling to formulate a satisfactory definition, have devised a myriad of tests for determining whether more than one offense have been committed.' A majority of jurisdictions follow the
"same evidence" test, which the Supreme Court adopted and has
never overruled. This test provides that when the same act violates
two statutory provisions, two offenses may be charged if each provicriticized the Holiday dictum, because it states a concept totally repugnant to well established double jeopardy doctrine. The First Circuit has contested the dictum's validity, noting
the "brevity and lack of citation for [the] statement and the strong precedent both before
IHolidayl and since ....
" O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199, 1204 n.5 (1st Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973). The court refused to read Holiday as approving multiple
punishment for the same offense, commenting that at most it meant that "a sentence 'erroneous' under the [Federal Bank Robbery Act] cannot rise to a constitutional complaint, at
least for purposes of collateral attack." Id.
The only other cases that have considered the Holiday dictum are two early Eighth Circuit
cases; both mechanically reiterate the standard that "the erroneous imposition of two penalties for a single offense does not constitute double jeopardy." Michener v. United States, 157
F.2d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 331 U.S. 789 (1947); White v. Lescor,
155 F.2d 902, 904 (8th Cir. 1946). In neither case, however, was a double punishment sustained. The court in Michener implied that no true double jeopardy situation existed because
the imposition was erroneous and the sentence was void as to the excess. 157 F.2d at 620.
Thus it seems that the court did not take the Holiday dictum at face value. Similarly, in
White, the court noted that the sentence was erroneous but provided no remedy because the
defendant was clearly guilty of the offense that carried the maximum penalty (aggravated
bank robbery), and the lesser penalty (for bank robbery) ran concurrently with the greater.
155 F.2d at 904. Therefore, these cases support the Holiday dictum in a qualified fashion only.
See also Note, Criminal Law-Multiple Punishment Resulting from a Single Course of Criminal Conduct, 25 ARK. L. REV. 181 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Criminal Law-Multiple
Punishment]; Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
15. These tests have split into two groups: those based on evidentiary requirements (the
"same evidence" test) and those based on the defendant's behavior (the "same act," "same
transaction," and "same intent" tests). CriminalLaw-Multiple Punishment, supra note 14,
at 183. In addition, the "rule of lenity" provides that when doubt exists as to whether
Congress intended the same act to constitute more than one offense, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the defendant and against dividing the act into multiple offenses. See
O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d at 1201-02. For a thorough analysis of these various tests,
see Irby v. United States, 390 F.2d 432, 437-39 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Leventhal, C.J., concurring);
Thessen v. State, 508 P.2d 1192, 1194-95 (Alas. 1973); Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 306-09
(Alas. 1970); Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 611 (1960);
Carroway, Pervasive Multiple Offense Problems-A Policy Analysis, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 105;
Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single CriminalAct, 21 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1937);
Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections on the Neal Doctrine,
58 CALIF. L. REV. 357 (1970); Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58
YALE L.J. 513 (1949); Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L.
REV. 317 (1954); Sigler, FederalDouble Jeopardy Policy, 19 VAND. L. REV. 375 (1966); Note,
Double Jeopardy and the Multiple-Count Indictment, 57 YALE L.J. 132 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as Double Jeopardy]; Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy
Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
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sion requires proof of a fact that the other does not.'6 The judiciary
has criticized this test for some time and has suggested that it has
outlived its usefulness. 7 Critics of the test charge that it allows an
imaginative prosecutor to divide a single criminal transaction into
an almost limitless number of offenses, it provides a poor measure
of criminal culpability, and it affords the defendant little protection
against double jeopardy.' 8
The doctrine of lesser included offenses is a significant but limited
protection against the ability of the prosecutor to multiply one criminal transaction into several punishable offenses. This principle forbids punishment for both the greater and any necessarily included
lesser offenses. 9 A lesser offense is "necessarily included" within the
greater if it is impossible to commit the greater without also
committing the lesser."0 Punishment may be imposed for either the
16. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The test, as originally stated,
is that "unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might have been convicted upon
by proof of the facts contained in the second indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment
can be no bar to the second." The King v. Vandercomb and Abbott, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461
(Crown 1796).
17. The original purpose of the "same evidence" test was to enable the prosecution to avoid
the adverse consequences of a finding of variance between the pleading and the proof. If the
state is allowed to charge "in various ways and in many counts what is essentially a continuing offense motivated bya single intent," Irby v. United States, 390 F.2d 432, 437 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (Leventhal C. J., concurring), the criminal will be unable to avoid punishment for
his offense because of a procedural technicality. See Kirchheimer, supra note 15, at 528-29.
18. See, e.g., Lugar, supra note 15, at 322-24; Double Jeopardy, supra note 15, at 133-37.
Many courts simply have misinterpreted the test by holding that if two statutory provisions
call for different proof, separate sentences may be imposed on each. Under this interpretation
of the "same evidence" test, a defendant could be sentenced for both a greater and a lesser
included offense. This result clearly is forbidden under the "same evidence" rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Harris, 26 F. Supp. 788, 791-92 (S.D. Calif. 1939). Statements such as the
one made by the court in Harris and similar misinterpretations of the test (i.e., "[If the
offense defined in one [statute] embraces an element not included in the other [double
jeopardy does not attach]," Slade v. United States, 85 F.2d 786, 791 (10th Cir. 1936)), were
probably the result of somewhat vague language in several Supreme Court decisions. For
example, in Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915), the Supreme Court stated: "[Tlhe test
of identity of offenses is whether the same evidence is required to sustain them .... Id. at
641. Such poor treatment of the "same evidence" test is somewhat surprising because the
Court cited Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911), among other cases, as supportive
of this statement. In Gavieres the Court clearly stated the test of identity of offenses to be
whether "each [offense has] an element not embraced in the other." Id. at 345 (emphasis
added).
19. See Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960); Johnson,
supra note 15, at 358; Kirchheimer, supra note 15, at 529. The protection agaihst double
jeopardy afforded by the lesser included offense doctrine is minimal at best, because the scope
of its coverage remains uncertain. Id.
20. For a more extensive analysis of lesser included offenses, see notes 286-96 infra &
accompanying text.
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greater or the lesser offense, but not for both.
Another protection against the potentially harsh results of the
"same evidence" test is the Congressional intent that may be evidenced within a given statute. Although Congress may not dictate
a scheme of punishment affording less double jeopardy protection
than that provided by the "same evidence" test, it may establish a
scheme providing more protection. The issue then is to determine
"[w]hat Congress has made the allowable unit of prosecution."',
A criminal transaction violating more than one statutory provision,
and thus theoretically capable of sustaining multiple penalties
under the "same evidence" test, might actually be capable of sustaining but one because of legislative intent." More often than not,
however, the penalty scheme intended by Congress is not readily
discernible, even following careful analysis of statutory language
and legislative history.
The Supreme Court has devised the "rule of lenity," a statutory
rule of interpretation that bars double punishment when Congressional intent is uncertain. The "rule of lenity" provides that when
"Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly
and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a
single transaction into multiple offenses .. ."23 The courts have
used this rule increasingly in cases in which Congressional intent as
to multiple punishment is doubtful. 4 Judges Bazelon and Wright,
dissenting in one case, even have suggested that the rule "may well
be a constitutionally compelled canon of construction."2"
In determining whether the various subsections of the Federal
Bank Robbery Act create more than one punishable offense, courts
21. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952).
22. For example, a person who robs a teller at gunpoint and kills a bystander while
committing the robbery has violated two provisions of the Bank Robbery Act (specifically,
subsections (d) and (e)). Yet courts generally have held that Congressional intent was not to
multiply such criminal transactions into two punishable offenses. See notes 63-65 infra &
accompanying text.
23. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955). The petitioner in Bell had been charged
in two counts with violation of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1910), as amended 18 U.S.C.
§ 2421 (1970). Each count referred to the transportation across state lines of a different
woman. The Court refused to find that petitioner had committed two offenses, as it could
have by applying the "same evidence" test. Rather, the Court decided that the ambiguity in
the statute as to Congressional intent should be resolved in favor of lenity. 349 U.S. at 84.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222 (1952);
Cramer v. Wise, 501 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1974); O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199,
1202 (1st Cir. 1972).
25. Irby v. United States, 390 F.2d 432, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon & Wright, JJ.,
dissenting).
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have been confronted with the above restraints on the prosecution's
power to multiply one criminal transaction into several punishable
offenses. A court's finding that any two of the Act's subsections do
not create separate, punishable offenses, however, is not dispositive
of whether other subsections are separately punishable. A careful
analysis of each subsection is therefore necessary.
PUNISHMENT ALLOWABLE UNDER THE VARIOUS SUBSECTIONS

Subsection (d)
A clear majority of the courts have recognized that subsection
(d),11 for purposes of punishment at least, does not create an offense
separate and distinct from subsections (a) and (b).21 Rather, subsection (d) merely provides a greater penalty for anyone who assaults"
or puts any person's life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous
weapon while committing or attempting to commit any offense described in subsections (a) or (b). 9 Subsections (a) and (b), and
subsection (d), taken together, merely establish the permissible
range of penalties. If the higher penalty authorized under (d) is
imposed, it is in lieu of, and not in addition to, the penalty
authorized under subsections (a) and (b). Some courts have based
their conclusion that a defendant may not be punished for an of26. Formerly 12 U.S.C. § 588b(b) (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as § 2113(d)].
27. Formerly 12 U.S.C. § 588b(a) (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (b) (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as §§ 2113(a) and (b)].
28. See notes 75-78 infra & accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 696 (2d Cir. 1957); Ward v. United
States, 183 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir. 1950); Remine v. United States, 161 F.2d 1020, 1021 (6th
Cir. 1947); Gant v. United States, 161 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1947); O'Keith v. United States,
158 F.2d 591, 592 (5th Cir. 1946); Crum v. United States, 151 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1945);
Dimenza v. Johnston, 130 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1942); Hewitt v. United States, 110 F.2d 1,
11 (8th Cir. 1940). Language in Hewitt, insofar as it relates to § 2113(d), is representative of
the view that subsection (d) does not create a separate offense: "Congress in enacting
[sections 2113(d) and 2113(e)], was dealing with the crime of bank robbery, and not with
forcible taking, putting in fear, assault, putting lives in jeopardy, killing and kidnapping as
distinct crimes. In effect, Congress created three classes of bank robbery according to degree;
first, that which was accompanied by force or putting in fear; second, that which was accompanied by assault or putting lives in jeopardy; and third, that which was accompanied by
killing or kidnapping." Id. at 11.
The Supreme Court, though never expressly ruling on the nature of subsection (d), stated
in Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941), that respondent had admitted, in a habeas
corpus proceeding, that robbery and jeopardizing the lives of bank officials in the course of
the robbery did not constitute two separate crimes, but that the statute merely prescribed
different penalties depending on the manner of the crime's perpetration. Id. at 349.
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fense under (a) or (b) and also for an offense under (d) on the theory
of merger, under which the lesser degree of the crime merges into
the greater degree of that crime.30 Thus, if a defendant is charged
with robbery [(a)] and endangering lives by means of a dangerous
weapon while committing that robbery [(d)], the former crime is
said to merge into the latter and to lose its identity as a separate,
punishable offense.3
Subsections (a) and (b)
A more difficult problem for the courts has been whether the four
types of proscribed conduct under subsections (a) and (b)-robbery,
entry with felonious intent, petit larceny, and grand larceny-constitute four phases of a single offense, or whether they
constitute four separate and distinct offenses. Prior to Prince v.
United States,32 those circuits holding that violations of subsections
(a) and (b) constituted but one offense33 did so indirectly, speaking
only in terms of the statute creating "but a single offense with
various degrees of aggravation permitting sentences of increasing
severity."34 In most of these cases the Government was charging the
30. See, e.g., United States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 696 (2d Cir. 1957) (count charging
bank robbery and count charging endangering lives during robbery merge into one substantive crime); Coy v. United States, 156 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 841
(1946) (recognizing the doctrine of merger in bank robbery cases).
At common law, if a single criminal act constituted both a misdemeanor and a felony, the
misdemeanor was said to merge into, and thus be extinguished by, the felony. J. MILLER,
CRIMINAL LAW §13, at 50 (1934). This common law rule has been changed by statute in many
states; the present test of whether merger applies is "not ... whether the two criminal acts
are 'successive steps in the same transaction' but . . . whether one crime necessarily involves
another .... " Commonwealth ex rel. Moszczynski v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 102, , 21 A.2d 920,
921 (1941). In Remine v. United States, 161 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1947), the court gave a very
expansive reading to the doctrine of merger by stating that the offense on which the lighter
sentence had been imposed (not necessarily the lesser offense) merged into the offense carrying the greater sentence. Id. at 1021.
31. Some courts, in declining to adopt the merger theory expressly, simply state that
whether subsection (d) provides a greater punishment for the same offense when committed
under aggravated circumstances, or whether the lesser offense merges into the greater, it is
certain that the Act clearly expresses Congressional intent to punish only the greater offense
where the testimony necessary to prove it is also necessary to prove the lesser. E.g., Durrett
v. United States, 107 F.2d 438, 439 (5th Cir. 1939).
32. 352 U.S. 322 (1957). The narrow holding in Prince that the crime of entering a bank
with felonious intent merges into the crime of robbery overrules pre-Prince cases only to the
extent they directly contradict that holding.
33. See, e.g., Simunov v. United States, 162 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1947); Barkdoll v. United
States, 147 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1945); Wilson v. United States, 145 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1944);
Hewitt v. United States, 110 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 641 (1940).
34. Simunov v. United States, 162 F.2d 314, 315 (6th Cir. 1947).
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violation of only one provision of subsection (a) or (b), usually robbery, in one count, and the aggravated form of that provision in
another. Therefore, when these courts spoke of the Act as defining
one crime, aggravated or not aggravated," they were not faced with
a violation of more than one provision under (a) and (b), such as
larceny and robbery, but only with the violation of one provision
under (a) or (b), such as robbery, perpetrated in its aggravated
form."6
In contrast, those circuits that held the various provisions of
subsections (a) and (b) to constitute four separate and distinct
crimes" dealt directly with this issue. These courts based their reasoning on the clear language of the statute,"s decisions under analogous statutes that declined to interpret them as supporting only one
conviction," and the reenactment by Congress of the 1934 bank
robbery statute in substantially identical form after it had been read
to create separate offenses.'" Therefore, when the defendant was
indicted for violating two provisions of (a) and (b) and also for
violating one of these two provisions in its aggravated form, the
offense charged in both its simple and aggravated forms could sustain one sentence only;4 the remaining charge under (a) and (b),
however, remained a separate and distinct offense, capable of supporting a separate sentence." Under this interpretation of (a) and
(b) a defendant charged with felonious entry into a bank [(a)],
robbery [(a)], and robbery by use of a dangerous weapon [(d)],
could receive only a single sentence for the two robbery violations,
but he could receive a separate, additional sentence for the felonious
entry violation.
35. Barkdoll v. United States, 147 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1945).
36. See, e.g., id. (robbery aggravated by kidnapping). A further indication that these courts
were not contemplating the four courses of conduct proscribed under (a) and (b) when they
spoke of one crime, aggravated or not aggravated, is that it strains ordinary English usage to
characterize robbery as an "aggravated" form of larceny, or larceny as an "aggravated" form
of entering a bank with felonious intent.
37. E.g., Ward v. United States, 183 F.2d 270 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 864 (1950);
Holbrook v. Hunter, 149 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1945); Wells v. United States, 124 F.2d 334,
335 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 661 (1942); Durrett v. United States, 107 F.2d 438,
439 (5th Cir. 1939).
38. Prince v. United States, 230 F.2d 568, 571 (5th Cir. 1956).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See notes 26-31 supra & accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Wells v. United States, 124 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1941); Durrett v. United States,
107 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1939).
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Prince v. United States
In Prince,43 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a
defendant was properly convicted and sentenced for both entering
a federally insured bank with intent to commit a felony and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court reversed.44 Although acknowledging the Act's meager legislative history, the Court nevertheless
found that Congress, by amending the Act in 1937, had inserted the
felonious entry provision to ensure that one who entered a bank for
the purpose of committing a crime but who was unsuccessful in his
attempt would not escape punishment." According to the Court, the
felonious entry provision was not intended to double the punishment of one who entered a bank with felonious intent and successfully completed the crime. The 1937 amendment merely created
lesser offenses; Congress did not authorize pyramided penalties, for
the gravamen of the offense is the intent to steal, not the act of
entering. This mental element merges into the completed crime if
the robbery is consummated.4"
The holding of Prince is puzzling in many respects. First, because
the Court granted certiorari to resolve the division among the circuits concerning the identity of offenses under subsections (a) and
(b), it is surprising that the Court used a legislative intent analysis
rather than a double jeopardy approach based on the same evidence
test. Three of the four acts proscribed by (a) and (b)-robbery,
grand larceny, and petit larceny-do not qualify as separate and
distinct offenses under the same evidence test because of the lesser
included offense rule.47 To commit robbery, one necessarily commits
larceny;48 the same relationship exists between grand and petit larceny. Therefore, the same evidence test, limited by the doctrine of
lesser included offenses, would have mandated a ruling that at least
these three acts were not separate and distinct offenses capable of
sustaining separate penalties. A second problem Prince presented
was the Court's limitation of its holding to the two offenses of felon43. Prince v. United States, 230 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
44. 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
45. Id. at 328.
46. Id.
47. See notes 19 & 20 supra & accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Lamore v. United States, 136 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1943); 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACriCE § 31.03[2], at 31-12 (2d ed. 1975) (impossible to commit robbery without first
committing larceny; thus, larceny is a necessarily included offense of robbery as a matter of
law).

1976]

BANK ROBBERY ACT

ious entry and robbery.49 The critical question of whether the other
provisions of (a) and (b) constituted separate offenses was left unresolved.
Finally, the Court's use of the merger theory to justify its holding
that entry and robbery created but one offense was unfortunate. Of
the four "offenses" proscribed under subsections (a) and (b), entry
with felonious intent is the only one to which the theory of merger
technically should not be applied. Although the role of merger in
today's criminal law system is uncertain, ' " the generally accepted
test governing whether one offense merges into another is whether
one crime necessarily is subsumed by the other.' Inasmuch as a
person may formulate the intent to commit robbery after entering
a bank, entry with felonious intent is not necessarily included in
robbery."
The Court's technical misapplication of the merger doctrine has
created confusion in two situations. First are those in which a court,
in sentencing a defendant, has not imposed the heaviest sentence
on the most inclusive count.5" Second are those in which a defendant
is charged with both felonious entry and larceny. 4 Because double
jeopardy proscribes the increasing of a sentence once imposed, the
strict application of merger in the former situation results in a defendent's escaping the heavier punishment because the count on
which that sentence was based is merged into the offense for which
a lesser sentence has been imposed. In the second instance, the
merger of the lesser offense of entry into the larceny count precludes
49. 352 U.S. at 325.
50. See note 30 supra & accompanying text. See also Pivak v, State, 202 Ind. 417, 175 N.E.
278, 280 (1931).
51. See, e.g., Price v. State, 3 Md. App. 155, -,
238 A.2d 275, 277 (1968); Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, -,
97 A.2d 343, 349 (1953) (test of merger is whether one
crime necessarily involves another, and not whether the two criminal acts are "successive
steps in the same transaction."); Pivak v. State, 202 Ind. 417, 175 N.E. 278 (1931) (doctrine
rejected).
52. For an analysis of necessarily included offenses, see notes 286-96 infra & accompanying
text.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1971) (ten years for entering
with felonious intent; five years for robbery; five years probation for aggravated robbery);
Sawyer v. United States, 312 F.2d 24 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 837 (1963) (20 years
for robbery; ten years for aggravated robbery); United States v. Leather, 271 F.2d 80 (7th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 831 (1960) (15 years for robbery; five years for aggravated
robbery).
54. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 454 F.2d 286 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 946
(1972); Counts v. United States, 263 F.2d 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 920 (1959);
Purdom v. United States, 249 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 913 (1958).
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sentencing under subsection (a), which carries a maximum penalty
of 20 years imprisonment, leaving only subsection (b), which carries
a maximum of only 10 years confinement."5 These anomalous results
have prompted judicial refusal to apply the Prince merger principle
in the above circumstances."
If the Supreme Court in Prince intended felonious entry to merge
into robbery, then logic compels the merging of entry into larceny
as well, for the mental element of felonious entry cannot merge into
robbery without also merging into the necessarily lesser included
offense of larceny. Alternatively, if the Court's merger language was
meant to apply to sentencing only, then those courts refusing to
extend the merger doctrine to larceny have not substantively
thwarted the Court's underlying purpose. By disallowing more than
one sentence upon convictions of both felonious entry and larceny,
those tribunals, though rejecting the theory of merger, have complied with the Supreme Court's mandate that there be no pyramiding of penalties.
Prince established that the imposition of multiple punishments
for violations under subsections (a) and (b) is invalid, but the analy55. Because the penalty scheme under the Act provides a maximum of 20 years imprisonment for felonious entry and only ten years for larceny, a person who entered a bank intending
to commit larceny actually would be penalized, under the merger theory, for failing to consummate the larceny. Moreover, had he taken under $100 his maximum punishment would
be only one year in prison. Such a result renders the theory of locus poenitentiae a nullity,
for a person, having entered the bank intending to commit larceny, could be "rewarded" with
ten extra years in prison for abandoning his larcenous intent.
56. To avoid these incongruous results of a strict application of Prince's merger language
to entry and larceny, several circuits have interpreted Prince as requiring merger of the
offenses for sentencing purposes only. These courts hold that both the entry with felonious
intent and the larceny provisions of (a) and (b) retain their identity for purposes of making
violative charges, Hardy v. United States, 292 F.2d 192, 194 (8th Cir. 1961), but under Prince,
sentence may be imposed on only one of them. Id. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 454 F.2d
286, 287 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 913 (1958) (where both entry with felonious intent
and larceny charged, there is no merger of offenses, but only merger for sentencing purposes);
United States v. Fried, 436 F.2d 784, 786 (6th Cir. 1971) (merger for sentencing purposes
only); Counts v. United States, 263 F.2d 603, 604 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 920 (1959)
(no merger of offenses); Williamson v. United States, 265 F.2d 236, 238 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 941 (1959) (merger of offenses not mandated by Prince; only pyramiding of
sentences proscribed); La Duke v. United States, 253 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1958) (felonious
entry does not merge into larceny); Purdom v. United States, 249 F.2d 822, 826 (10th Cir.
1957) (common law doctrine of merger applies only to situations where same act constitutes
both misdemeanor and felony; does not apply where two felonies are charged).
Occasionally, courts confronted with this situation will endorse the contention that the two
offenses merge. Not surprisingly, however, the courts do so only when the sentences imposed
on both counts are identical, and applying the doctrine results in no anomaly. See, e.g.,
Schutz v. United States, 432 F.2d 25, 29 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002 (1971).
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sis underlying this result left unclear whether the Court intended to
deal with the issue in terms of lesser included offenses. The merger
language in the opinion does not compel the conclusion that the
lesser offenses defined by the Act invariably merge into a consummated greater offense, thereby extinguishing them as separate and
distinct violations. 7 Because the Court's usage neither conforms
with common law merger theory" nor develops a satisfactory new
doctrine, 9 it cannot be accepted without question.
Subsection (e)
The relationship of subsection (e) to the other subsections also
remains unclear after Prince. Subsection (e) provides:
[wlhoever, [1160 in committing any offense defined in this section, or [2] in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for
the commission of such offense, or [3] in freeing himself or attempting to free himself from arrest or confinement for such offense, kills any person or forces any person to accompany him
without the consent of such person, shall be imprisoned not less
than ten years, or punished by death if the jury shall so direct. "
Because the Supreme Court in Prince did not mention this subsection, substantial doubt still exists whether it defines separate and
2
distinct offenses for which separate punishments may be imposed.1
Those courts dealing with type [1] killing or kidnapping have
held that subsection (e) does not create a separate and distinct
crime, but encompasses only an aggravated form of the offense of
bank robbery, commission of which merely enhances the penalty.9"
57. This question is not merely academic, for adverse collateral consequences accompany
the imposition of multiple convictions, even in the absence of multiple sentences. See notes
210-13 and note 238 infra & accompanying text.
58. See note 30 supra & accompanying text.
59. United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 549 (3d Cir. 1971).
60. Numeration is added for convenience in distinguishing the three types of killing and
kidnapping.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1970). The death penalty as provided in this subsection has been
declared invalid. Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968). See note 2 supra.
62. The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System has noted this
confusion. In particular, the Commission found that the confusion among the courts was
greatest regarding the status of subsection (e). Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendation for Change, 67
F.R.D. 195, 284 (1975) (Appendix B).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Faleafine, 492 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1974); Jones v. United
States, 396 F.2d 66, 69 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969); United States v.
Drake, 250 F.2d 216, 217 (7th Cir. 1957). To the extent that three earlier Ninth Circuit cases,
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The courts have reached this conclusion by analogy to subsection
(d), the language of which closely resembles that of (e) [1]."4 The
operation of both subsection (d) and subsection (e) [1] is dependent upon a concurrent violation of some provision of the Act. Thus
subsection (e) [1] has been accorded the same treatment as subsection (d).11
The agreement among the circuits as to type [1] killing or kidnapping does not extend to types [2] and [3]. Those courts which,
when confronted with types [2] or [3] killing or kidnapping, held
that but one offense has been committed, made no attempt to distinguish among the three types of killing and kidnapping proscribed
by subsection (e). 5 Rather, these courts simply reiterated the arguments successfully propounded in the past to deny subsection (d)
status as a separate offense, and to establish (e) [1] killing or
kidnapping as a single offense only. 7 These courts found further
Clermont v. United States, 432 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1970) (for each victim under (d), and thus
impliedly under (e), a separate sentence will lie); Crum v. United States, 151 F.2d 510 (9th
Cir. 1945) ((e) can sustain a separate sentence); Barkdoll v. United States, 147 F.2d 617 (9th
Cir. 1945) (count under (e) charged a separate offense), were inconsistent with the ruling in
Faleafine, they were overruled by Faleafine. 492 F.2d at 25-26.
64. Subsection (d) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, in committing, or in attempting
to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person
. .. ."18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1970). This language is paralleled in that portion of subsection
(e) dealing with type [11 killing or kidnapping: "Whoever, in committing any offense defined
in this section . . . kills any person, or forces any person to accompany him.
... 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(e) (1970).
65. Under this interpretation of subsection (e), the offenses defined in (a), (b), and (d) are
included in, and thus are merged into, subsection (e) [11 killing or kidnapping. Whether
subsection (d) is necessarily included under subsection (e) [1] killing or kidnapping is
uncertain. For instance, it is quite possible to both kidnap and kill a person in the commission
of robbery without placing lives in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, just as it is
possible to commit the offense described in (d) without also killing or kidnapping. Each
section potentially contains elements not contained in the other; thus neither would be a
necessarily included offense of the other. This supposition is premised on a reading of the Act
that requires the assault defined in (d) to be by the use of a dangerous weapon, see notes 7582 infra & accompanying text, and a literal interpretation of the doctrine of lesser included
offenses, see notes 286-96 infra & accompanying text.
66. In United States v. Drake, 250 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1957), which dealt with type [1]
kidnapping, one judge emphasized that he concurred in the majority result (subsection (e)
does not create a separate, punishable offense) only because it had been a type [11 kidnapping which occurred during the commission of the robbery. Had it been a type [21 or [3]
kidnapping, he noted, a separate crime would have been charged. Id. at 218 (Schnackenberg,
,J., concurring).
67. Included among these arguments are: 1) The Act creates but a single offense with
various degrees of aggravation, see, e.g., Garza v. United States, 498 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir.
1974); Sullivan v. United States, 485 F.2d 1352, 1353 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Drake,
250 F.2d 216, 217 (7th Cir. 1957); Simunov v. United States, 162 F.2d 314, 315 (6th Cir. 1947);
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corroboration in Prince, in which the Court stated that the Bank
Robbery Act was a unique statute of limited purposes that should
be differentiated from similar problems in this general field raised
under other statutes."
The substantive distinctions among the three types of killing and
kidnapping proscribed by subsection (e) are central to the contention of other circuits that (e) [2] and [3] create separate and
distinct offenses. In support of their position, these circuits point to
Congressional use of the disjunctive word "or" in defining the offenses under subsection (e),11 the distinctive penalty scheme of that
subsection, ° and the contemplation of criminal conduct that may
occur after the underlying
offense has been fully consummated and
71
arrest.
after
even
2) Congress did not intend to pyramid the penalties in the subsections of the Act, see, e.g.,
United States v. Turner, 518 F.2d 14, 16 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d
1360, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Drake, 250 F.2d 216, 217 (7th Cir. 1957); and 3)
The severity of the punishment allowed under the statute depends, not on the number of
subsections violated, but on the nature of the aggravating circumstances, see, e.g., O'Clair
v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199, 1202 (1st Cir. 1972).
68. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 325 (1957).
69. United States v. Parker, 283 F.2d 862, 864 (7th Cir. 1960) (type [3] kidnapping);
Gilmore v. United States, 124 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1942) (type [3] murder). The judge
writing the majority opinion in Parker cited United States v. Drake, 250 F.2d 216 (7th Cir.
1957), as authority for the proposition that types [2] and [3] constitute separate offenses.
The court in Drake, however, made no such ruling. Id. at 218. Rather, the judge in Parker
cited his own concurring opinion in Drake. It would seem, then, that the holding in Parker is
based on questionable precedent.
70. Clark v. United States, 281 F.2d 230, 233 (10th Cir. 1960) (type [2] kidnapping).
71. Ward v. United States, 183 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir. 1950) (type [2] kidnapping). The
court also noted that subsections (a), (b), and (d) were included under section 2 of the statute
as originally enacted, subsection (e) was included under section 3, and that section 3 embraced elements in addition to, and separate from, those included under section 2. Id. at 272.
After carefully outlining its reasons for considering subsection (e) a separate and distinct
offense, the court concluded with the surprising statement: "[Aissuming, but not deciding,
that [defendant] should not have been sentenced for a lesser term on count one [aggravated
robberyl .... ." Id. Such a statement reduces the court's analysis of subsection (e) as a
separate offense to an exercise in futility, for the purpose of finding (e) to be a separate and
distinct offense is to enable the court to impose separate sentences thereunder. There is no
indication in Ward that the court was endeavoring to preserve subsection (e)'s status as a
separate and distinct offense merely for purposes of sustaining a multiple conviction, but not
multiple sentences. See notes 249-61 infra & accompanying text.
A reason not mentioned by the courts for viewing the conduct proscribed under (e) as
separate offenses and not merely as an aggravated form of the underlying offense of bank
robbery is that none of the three types of killing and kidnapping can be said to be more
aggravated than the other. The other subsections of the Act can be regarded as successive
phases of one criminal transaction, each succeeding phase encompassing conduct of a more
culpable nature (entry with felonious intent, petit larceny, grand larceny, robbery, and robbery accompanied by assault or jeopardizing lives by the use of a dangerous weapon); the
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Although a majority of courts that have passed upon the separate
offense status of (e) have grounded their reasoning on legislative
intent, sometimes the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution
should supersede any perceived contrary Congressional purpose.
Because kidnapping is punishable under the Bank Robbery Act only
when some other offense comprehended by that statute has been
committed, a defendant charged with, for example, both robbery
[(a)] and kidnapping to avoid apprehension for that robbery
[(e)[2]], could not be sentenced separately on both offenses because of the same evidence limitation. Proof of the (e) [2] violation
requires proof of the underlying violation of (a). A charge of violations of (a) and (e) alone apparently has not yet come before the
courts. Combined charges of robbery [(a)], aggravated robbery
[(d)], and kidnapping [(e)], however, are common.72 Double jeopardy does not arise as between (d) and (e) when there are different
victims under each subsection. If the charges under (d) and (e) stem
from the same victims, however, the constitutional issue is not resolved so easily.
A requirement that the offense be committed with a dangerous
weapon can be read into subsection (d). Such an interpretation
would remove (d) and (e) from the ambit of the same evidence test
because an assault might be committed with a dangerous weapon
and a kidnapping or killing without. If no such requirement is imposed, or if a subjective test of lesser included offense is used, separate sentencing on both counts would raise double jeopardy implications. The case law does not establish a clear rule on the requirement of a dangerous weapon. Subsection (d) speaks to an offender
types of proscribed conduct under (e), however, cannot be arranged in ascending order according to the level of culpability, for it cannot be said that any one type of conduct under
(e) is more egregious than any other.
Although the above argument might suggest a legislative intent that (e) establishes separate offenses, the countervailing argument, that Congress included the three types of conduct
under (e) to ensure that all criminal conduct within the res gestae of the underlying robbery
would be covered, is equally persuasive. Under this view it is immaterial which of the three
types of kidnapping or killing is the most aggravated. Whichever type occurs during the
course of a robbery simply will be the additional element under the statute that warrants the
imposition of a higher sentence. Should more than one type of killing or kidnapping occur,
the matter should be treated as one offense involving multiple victims. See notes 84-87 infra
& accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1974);
Forrester v. United States, 456 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Parker, 283 F.2d
862 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Drake, 250 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1957); Ward v. United
States, 183 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1950).
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who "assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person
by the use of a dangerous weapon or device. . . ."' Shortly after
the passage of the Act, several courts read this provision literally,
concluding that "or" was used in the disjunctive, and that it was
unnecessary to allege in an indictment both the assault of a person
and the placing of that person's life in jeopardy by means of a
dangerous weapon. 4 A majority of courts considering this problem,
however, concluded that something more than simple assault was
necessary to trigger subsection (d) with its enhanced penalties."'
Because assault traditionally is defined as "putting another in apprehension of harm whether or not the actor actually intends to
inflict or is capable of inflicting that harm, 7 6 to require no more for
subsection (d) would make any violation of subsection (a) an aggravated offense because (a) speaks in terms of "force," "violence,"
and "intimidation." 7 Construing "assault" in (d) to mean simple
assault, then, would render that provision superfluous."
A few courts, including, by implication, the Supreme Court,"
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
74. See, e.g., Larson v. United States, 172 F.2d 386, 387 (6th Cir. 1949) (elements of offense
cited in the alternative, thus assault alone suffices); Gant v. United States, 161 F.2d 793, 796
(5th Cir. 1947) (alleged assault against cashier in commission of robbery); United States v.
Murray, 149 F.2d 932, 933 (3d Cir. 1945) ("or" to be read disjunctively). Had Congress
intended the two phrases to be read in the conjunctive, reasoned these courts, it would have
used the word "and" instead of the word "or."
75. The confusion concerning the elements of subsection (d) assault is due to the failure
of Congress to define "assault" anywhere in the Federal Criminal Code. United States v.
Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279, 1284 (6th Cir. 1971).
76. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177 (1958).
77. "Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes . . . from the person of
another any property . . .shall be fined . . .or imprisoned." 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1970)
(emphasis supplied).
78. United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279, 1284 (6th Cir. 1971) (use of fake bomb during
attempted robbery).
A basic canon of statutory construction is that every word and clause, if possible, should
be given effect. 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsTRucrION § 46.06 at 63 (4th ed. C. Sands
ed. 1973). Inasmuch as a violation of subsection (a) necessarily would constitute an assault,
construing subsection (d) as requiring nothing more than simple assault is unwarranted; or
"[t]o borrow the homely metaphor of Judge Aldrich in the First Circuit, 'If there is a big
hole in the fence for the big cat, need there be a small hole for the small one?'" Jarecki v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) (no citation given for quotation from Judge
Aldrich). As further explained by that court: "The statute [unrelated to bank robbery]
admits a reasonable construction which gives effect to all of its provisions. In these circumstances we will not adopt a strained reading which renders one part a mere redundancy." Id.
at 307-08.
79. In Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 329 n.11 (1957), the Supreme Court stated
that conviction of robbery aggravated by assault with a deadly weapon subjects a robber to
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have concluded that the phrase "by the use of a dangerous weapon"
should be read to modify both the assault provision and the "putting in jeopardy" provision of subsection (d).10 Most courts that
require more than simple assault, however, have sought to construct
a workable definition of assault for subsection (d) purposes. The
recent trend has been to require the bank robbers not only to intend
and in fact to create a reasonable apprehension in the victim, but
additionally to have the objective capability to cause physical harm
to the victim by the means threatened."' Although not expressly
stipulating that a dangerous weapon be used in the course of the
assault, all the cases adopting this "objective capability" test were
cases of attempted robberies by means of a potentially dangerous
weapon. Arguably, these cases imply a dangerous weapon prerequisite. Otherwise, an unarmed robber who verbally threatens a bank
teller with physical harm theoretically could meet the "objective
capability" test. This situation is not far removed from the "taking
by force, fear or intimidation" of subsection (a). It is thus reasonable to assume that the "objective capability" test requires the use
of a dangerous weapon.82
Interpreting (d) to mandate the use of a dangerous weapon, however, would allow an unarmed bank robber who seriously injures a
person in the course of the robbery to escape the heavier punishment
a possible punishment of 25 years. This language implies that the assault must be by means
of a dangerous weapon.
80. The Tenth Circuit, by the clever use of ellipsis, reached this desired reading in Holbrook v. Hunter, 149 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1945), by stating: "[Slubsection (b) [now section
2113(d)] provides that '[wihoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense
defined in subsection (a) [now subsections (a) and (b)] . . . assaults any person . . . by
the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned ....
" Id. at 231.
Accord, United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279, 1283 (6th Cir. 1971) (McCree, J., dissenting).
Further support for the proposition that the phrase "by the use of a dangerous weapon"
modifies both provisions of (d) can be gleaned from a reading of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 254, as
reported out of the House Judiciary Committee. The committee report used different language from that later adopted in the statute: "If an assault be committed or the life of any
person put in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon .
H.R. REP. No. 1461, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1934).
81. Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d 264, 275 (8th Cir. 1971) (use of fake bomb during
attempted robbery). The Second and Seventh Circuits similarly interpret the "jeopardy"
provision of (d). See United States v. Stewart, 513 F.2d 957, 960 (2d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Rizzo, 409 F.2d 400, 403
(7th Cir. 1969).
82. Such an interpretation of the "objective capability" test is bolstered by the court's
statement in Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d 264, 272-73 (8th Cir. 1971), that it was
adopting the result reached by the dissent in United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279 (6th
Cir. 1971). The dissent in Beasley concluded that subsection (d) assault required the use of
a dangerous weapon. Id. at 1283.
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of that provision. Under such an interpretation of the Act all serious
batteries not causing death and not committed by the use of a
dangerous weapon could only be punished under subsection (a). A
solution that preserves the progressive penalty scheme of the Act
would, in addition to requiring the use of a dangerous weapon for a
violation of (d), include a provision in the Act for battery committed
during the robbery."
Multiple Victims
There is no constitutional objection to charging several offenses
under separate counts when there is more than one victim. Most
courts confronted with the issue of multiple victims, however, have
declared that Congress did not intend the imposition of multiple
punishments,8 4 stressing that the crime is bank robbery, and that
''
the statute is entitled "Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes. 5
83. This additional subsection could distinguish between simple battery and battery committed by the use of a dangerous weapon. Moreover, such a subsection might be extended to
cover batteries that occur during the three phases of robbery set out in subsection (e).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045, 1053 (7th Cir. 1974) (defendant
charged in separate counts with robbery of different tellers); United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d
1360, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974) (defendant charged in separate counts with killing three people in
attempting to avoid apprehension); United States v. Faleafine, 492 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1974)
(different persons were the victims of (d) and (e) ([1]) kidnapping); United States v. Canty,
469 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (defendant charged in separate counts with assaulting three
persons by means of a dangerous weapon); Dimenza v. Johnston, 130 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.
1942) (defendant charged in three separate counts with three aggravated assaults). Earlier
cases either refused to reach the issue of multiple victims, see, e.g., Duboice v. United States,
195 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1952) (several people kidnapped under (e) [21 circumstances; court
upheld all convictions on ground that the longest concurrent sentence lawfully could be
sustained under the statute), or mechanically applied the "same evidence" test in concluding
that a separate punishment could be sustained for each victim involved, see, e.g., Clermont
v. United States, 432 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 997 (1971) (separate
convictions allowed for each person assaulted); McDonald v, Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 196 (10th
Cir. 1942) (lives of several people put in jeopardy by means of a dangerous weapon). The
Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Faleafine, supra at 24, 26, expressed strong disapproval of
Clermont, noting that the court in Clermont had not cited Dimenza v. Johnston, supra, and
overruled Clermont to the extent it allowed multiple punishment for each victim assaulted
under subsection (d).
85. See United States v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045, 1054 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Canty, 469 F.2d 114, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court in Canty was confronted with a situation
in which the defendant was charged with four counts of bank robbery under the federal
statute and with three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon under the District of
Columbia Code (22 D.C. Code § 502 (1967)). The court held that the effect of charging the
defendant with the latter offenses under the District of Columbia Code was the circumvention
of the federal statute's "carefully crafted hierarchy of penalties." Id. at 128. The imposition
of sentence under the federal statute for bank robbery (§ 2113(a)) and under the District of
Columbia Code for assault with a dangerous weapon (22 D.C. Code § 502), was an illegal
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Courts viewing sentence pyramiding with disfavor on the Prince
rationale have extended that rationale to cases involving multiple

victims." But this general proscription of multiple punishments for
offenses against multiple victims is not applied universally to cases
in which more than one type of violation under subsection (e) has
occurred. In those circuits holding that (e) [2] or (e) [3] killing or
kidnapping constitutes a separate offense, multiple victims clearly
can provide the basis for separate convictions and sentences. Thus,
if a bank robber kills or kidnaps three persons while attempting to
avoid apprehension, he commits only one offense. If he kills or kidnaps three persons while avoiding apprehension, and also kills or
kidnaps two others while freeing or attempting to free himself from
arrest or confinement, then two offenses may be charged-not because there was more than one victim, but because there were two
types of killing or kidnapping.87
Subsection (c)
Distinguishable from the other subsections of the Act is subsection (c), which provides that "[w]hoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of, any property or money"
pyramiding of sentences. The court found the separate sovereign doctrine, which allows both
federal and state prosecutions for the same offense, to be inapplicable because both the
District of Columbia Code and the Federal Bank Robbery Statute were enacted by the same
sovereign, the federal government. Id. at 128 n.20. In United States v. Cooper, 504 F.2d 260
(D.C. Cir. 1974), the District of Columbia Circuit, although citing Canty for the proposition
that only two of the three bank robberies charged could stand (separate victims were the basis
for each count), held that separate convictions could be sustained, under the District of
Columbia Code, for each person assaulted by means of a dangerous weapon. Id. at 263. Why
the District of Columbia Circuit refused to follow Canty is unclear, but inasmuch as the
separate convictions for each assault victim were based on the District of Columbia Code,
the ruling in Cooper is not dispositive of the propriety of multiple punishments based on
offenses against multiple victims under the Federal Bank Robbery Act.
86. United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974). That a bank robber cannot
receive multiple sentences under the Act on the basis of offenses against multiple victims does
not mean that he escapes punishment for his crimes against such victims. Rather, the separate robbing, assaulting, killing, or kidnapping of each victim still provides a basis for punishment under state law.
87. Few cases have dealt with offenses against different victims under different subsections
of the Act (for example, aggravated assault of victim A under subsection (d) and kidnapping
of victim B under subsection (e)). United States v. Faleafine, 492 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1974),
which prohibited separate punishments on the basis of multiple victims, dealt only with
aggravated assault (d) and (e) [11kidnapping. The court did not decide whether separate
punishments on the basis of offenses against multiple victims would be allowed if aggravated
assault (d), and (e) [21 or (e) [31 kidnapping were involved. Id. at 24.
88. The Ninth Circuit is apparently the only circuit that makes a distinction between the
various offenses delineated in subsection (c). See United States v. Tyler, 466 F.2d 920 (9th
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. . .knowing the same to have been taken from a bank. . . shall
be subject to the punishment provided by. . .subsection (b) for the

taker."" The Supreme Court, in Heflin v. United States, ° held that
subsection (c) was designed not to increase the punishment for one
who robs a bank," but to reach a different group of wrongdoers.2
The circuits are split, however, as to the proper remedy when the
trial court misinterprets subsection (c) and fails to instruct the jury
that it can convict the defendant either of robbery, or of receiving,
but not both. 3 Such a failure occurred in Milanovich v. United
States,'" in which the Supreme Court held that, because there was
no way of discerning how a properly instructed jury would have
found in the case, the proper remedy was to remand for a new trial. 5
Notwithstanding Milanovich, the circuits remain divided in similar
cases. Although a majority of courts remanded for a new trial in
cases in which the trial court failed to give proper instructions,"
Cir. 1972) (receipt of and possession of stolen property are two separate offenses); D'Argento
v. United States, 353 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1965) (by analogy, theft and possession of stolen
property are separate offenses). This circuit reads the two Supreme Court decisions on this
issue, Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S.
415 (1959), as holding only that a person convicted of larceny cannot be convicted also of
receiving. The dissent in Tyler, supra at 926-27, following the position of the majority of the
circuits, emphatically rejected this distinction between the offenses delineated in subsection
(c). Congress, noted the dissent, did not intend to differentiate between the offenses covered
in (c), but meant only to reach an entirely new group of wrongdoers. Id. at 927. To the extent
that Tyler and DArgento are in conflict with United States v. Gaddis, 96 S. Ct. 1023 (1976),
they seemingly are overruled.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1970).
90. 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
91. Subsection (c) is not a different degree of the crime of bank robbery as is subsection
(d), Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959) (by implication), nor is it a separate offense
for which one found guilty of bank robbery can be given a separate sentence as, in certain
circuits, are (e) 121 and (e) [31 killing and kidnapping. Id. at 419-20.
92. Id. at 420. The Senate report, providing for the addition of subsection (c), is entitled
"Punishment for Receivers of Loot from Bank Robbers." S. REP. No. 1801, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1940). See H.R. REP. No. 1668, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940), which also states that
Congress did not intend to pyramid penalties for lesser offenses of the bank robber following
the robbery but rather intended to make the knowing receipt or possession of property stolen
from a bank a separate and substantive offense.
93. See notes 99-103 infra & accompanying text.
94. 365 U.S. 551 (1961).
95. Id. at 555-56. Milanovich did not deal with the Federal Bank Robbery Act but with
convictions for counts of both larceny and receiving the proceeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
641 (1940). These offenses, under that section of the Code, serve roles corresponding to
robbing and receiving under subsection (c) of the Bank Robbery Act. Milanovich v. United
States, 275 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir. 1960), modified, 365 U.S. 551 (1961).
96. See, e.g., Rose v. United States, 448 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1971); Thomas v. United States,
418 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1969); Keating v. United States, 413 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1969); Glass
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some adopted other approaches. 7 For example, in cases in which the
sentence imposed on the subsection (c) conviction was concurrent
with that imposed on the robbery conviction, some courts refused
to remand for retrial." When the trial court failed to instruct the
jury properly and the evidence was overwhelming on the possession
count and merely derivative on the robbery count, however, one
circuit held that the Government was allowed to stipulate to disv. United States, 351 F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1963).
There are several dangers inherent in the "either/or" instructions required by Milanovich.
The facts adduced at trial might support a conviction for both robbery and receiving, yet
because of the court's instructions the jury would have to convict on only one and acquit on
the other, or simply return no verdict on the other count, which might work as an implied
acquittal. If the defendant's conviction should be overturned on appeal because of insufficiency of the evidence, for example, the defendant would go free. The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy would prohibit the imposition of a sentence on the other count,
even though the evidence adduced at trial overwhelmingly proved defendant guilty of that
crime. Brief for United States at 10-11, United States v. Gaddis, 96 S. Ct. 1023 (1976).
Another danger is that the court might elevate the instructions to a rule of evidence, as
did the Fourth Circuit in Phillips v. United States, 518 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1975). The trial
judge in Phillips, inexplicably failing to apply the doctrine of principals in the second degree,
instructed the jury that if it found the defendant not to have been physically present in the
bank during the robbery, it could not find him guilty of the crime of robbery of the bank.
The judge did instruct the jury, however, that it could convict the defendant of possession of
the proceeds of the robbery, styled incorrectly by the judge as a "lesser included offense" of
robbery, and the jury did so convict him. The conviction was set aside on the ground that
the charge as to possession was not included in the indictment. The grand jury issued a new
indictment, charging defendant with possession. At trial, the prosecution attempted to prove
defendant's knowing possession of stolen bank money by proving that he had been present
at the bank during the robbery. The evidence was admitted, and defendant was found guilty
of possessing stolen money under subsection (c). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that
because the first jury had acquitted the defendant of bank robbery by implication, the
prosecution was foreclosed from introducing any evidence tending to show defendant's presence at the bank during the robbery. Defendant was, according to the appellate court, either
guilty of receiving and possessing the stolen money or wholly innocent. Permitting the jury
to believe he actually participated in the robbery would violate the "mutually exclusive"
offense rule propounded in Heflin and Milanovich. Id. at 110. The appellate court thus raised
this rule, originally formulated merely to prevent an illegal pyramiding of sentences, to the
level of an evidentiary rule. The appellate court did hold, it is comforting to note, that the
defendant was estopped in the future from offering evidence that he was one of the bank
robbers as a defense to the charge of receiving and possessing. Id.
97. One approach was to restrict the application of Milanovich to robbing and receiving
cases and to refuse to apply its rationale to robbing and possession cases. See United States
v. Tyler, 466 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1972). Contra, United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1963). To the extent Tyler is inconsistent with the recent Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Gaddis, 96 S. Ct. 1023 (1976), seemingly it is overruled.
98. See United States v. Tyler, 466 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1972) (concurrent sentence doctrine
applied in refusing to remand for retrial). Contra, Glass v. United States, 351 F.2d 678 (10th
Cir. 1965) (new trial granted even though sentences on (d) and (c) were concurrent).
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missal of the robbery count." The conviction was thereby upheld,
and only resentencing was required.'1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict
among the circuits as to the proper application of Heflin and
0 ' the defendant was
Milanovich. In United States v. Gaddis,1
charged, inter alia, with both robbing a federally insured bank and
possessing the funds stolen in the robbery. The trial court permitted
the jury to convict defendant on both counts. 02 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial,
holding that Heflin prohibited conviction on both counts, and that
Milanovich mandated a new trial. 0 3 The Supreme Court affirmed
the holding of the court of appeals that the defendant could not be
convicted of both robbing the bank and receiving or possessing the
proceeds, but, because the case could be distinguished factually
from Milanovich, found error in remanding for a new trial. 014
In Milanovich, petitioner had driven the car which transported
the robbers to a Naval Commissary. She drove away, however, while
the robbers were still inside the Commissary. Seventeen days after
learning of the location of the money, she retrieved it and concealed
it in her home. Thus there was evidence from which the jury could
find petitioner guilty both of the robbery itself and of the receipt and
concealment of the money. Because the trial court allowed the jury
to convict on both counts, the Court held that the proper remedy
was remanding for a new trial because there was no way to determine upon which offense a properly instructed jury would have
convicted. 015
The Court in Gaddis, however, found that the only evidence implicating respondent in receiving was his participation in the robbery itself. This factual distinction warranted a different remedy-mere vacation of the conviction and sentence under the receiving count. The Court in Gaddis further noted that there could be
situations, as in Milanovich, in which the evidence would show that
the defendant was an accessory to the robbery as well as the receiver
or possessor of the robbery proceeds. In these situations an indict99. United States v. Sellers, 520 F.2d 1281, 1286 (4th Cir. 1975).
100. Id.
101. 96 S. Ct. 1023 (1976).
102, United States v. Gaddis, 506 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1975), modified, 96 S. Ct. 1023
(1976).
103. Id.
104. 96 S. Ct. 1023, 1026 (1976).
105. Id. at 1026-27.
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ment charging both offenses is perfectly proper and the trial judge
should instruct the jury to first consider the robbery count under
subsection (a), (b), or (d).'16 Only if the evidence is insufficient to
convict on that count should the jury consider the charge under
subsection (c). 107
As long as the Gaddis instructions are correctly given, therefore,
08
the Milanovich remedy of remand for a new trial is unnecessary.
If the jury finds the defendant guilty of both robbing and receiving,
the remedy is vacation of the conviction and sentence on the receiving count. Because the jury considered the robbery count initially,
106. Id. at 1027.
107. Id.
108. The majority, in refusing to overrule Milanovich, apparently was distinguishing between the results of convicting a principal in the first degree of both robbing and possessing
the loot and of convicting an accessory of those same offenses. At common law, a principal
in the first degree (the robber) could not be convicted of both robbing and possessing. Brief
for United States at 25-26, United States v. Gaddis, 96 S. Ct. 1023 (1976). When, therefore,
the jury erroneously convicted him of both offenses, the proper remedy was to set aside the
possession conviction and allow the robbery conviction to stand. Id. There existed a clear
priority of offenses; if the jury found the defendant guilty of robbing, it was improper to find
him guilty of possessing the proceeds as well. Had the jury done so, however, there would
have been no need to remand for a new trial to remedy the error. Id. at 28.
An accomplice who did not participate in the asportation of the loot from the scene of the
crime could be guilty under common law of committing both robbery and possession of the
proceeds. Moreover, there was no priority between the two offenses. Id. at 26. Milanovich
changed the common law as it applied to the Federal Bank Robbery Act by not allowing an
accessory to be convicted of both robbing and receiving. Milanovich v. United States, 365
U.S. 551, 554 (1961). It did not establish, however, an order of priority between the two
crimes. The Court therefore thought it necessary to remand for a new trial whenever the trial
court failed to give "either/or" instructions to the jury and erroneously convicted the defendant of both offenses. Brief for Onited States at 27, United States v. Gaddis, 96 S. Ct. 1023
(1976). The Government argued for a rule of priority in Milanovich situations under which
an accessory consistently could be convicted, on the facts, of either crime. Id. at 21. It
maintained that the lack of priority in such cases was at odds with Congressional intent to
include the receivers and possessors of stolen property within the scope of the Act by the
addition of subsection (c). This Congressional intent, urged the Government, when "read in
context and in light of the near-universal rule that the offense with the higher authorized
penalty is established as the offense to receive priority of consideration, extends such priority
to the offense of robbery." Id.
The Court seemingly accepted this argument, for it adopted a rule of priority that would
require a jury in Milanovich situations to consider the robbery counts ((a), (b), and (d)) first,
and only consider the receiving and possessing count (c) if the evidence were insufficient to
warrant a conviction under the robbery count. 96 S. Ct. at 1027. Apparently the Milanovich
remedy of a new trial will be necessary only for those pre-Gaddis cases involving Milanovich
fact situations in which the trial court failed to give the proper "either/or" instructions. In
the future, however, should the jury ignore the Gaddis instructions and convict the defendant
of both robbing and receiving, there will be no need to remand for a retrial. The conviction
on the receiving count will not taint the conviction on the robbery count, and the proper
remedy will be merely to vacate the receiving conviction.
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it apparently found sufficient evidence to convict on that charge.
The additional verdict on the receiving count is mere surplusage; it
does not taint the robbery conviction.
Still unresolved is the proper remedy for those cases in which the
trial judge fails to give the proper Gaddis instructions. History suggests that district judges will continue to make mistakes after
Gaddis." Of the hundreds of pre-Gaddisbank robbery cases dealing
with erroneous cumulative sentences, only two"" seem to suggest a
procedural cure similar to that proposed in Gaddis. That Gaddis did
not overrule Milanovich indicates that remand for a new trial still
may be an appellate court's only solution for these situations. The
concurring opinion in Gaddis suggests that vacation of the possession count is appropriate even when the jury erroneously was permitted to convict on two counts, as long as the court correctly instructed on all the elements of robbery."'
Draftsmanship and the Punishment Problems
Careful drafting could have prevented many of the problems arising under the Act."' The most glaring instance of poor drafting was
the imposition of a 20 year sentence for entering a bank with felonious intent under subsection (a). Because this penalty scheme authorizes a heavier sentence for an unsuccessful thief than for a successful one, thus rewarding the completion of the crime," 3 the courts
have circumvented it by refusing to apply the merger language of
Prince to larceny and entry with felonious intent."' Although this
approach avoids an anomalous result, it entails a narrow reading of
Prince that needlessly circumscribes the usefulness of that case.
A better solution to the felonious entry problem would have been
to omit the felonious entry provision entirely. If, as implied by
109. "ITIhere is no reason to believe that the mistakes will completely cease just because
the Court today reiterates the correct instructions." United States v. Gaddis, 96 S. Ct. 1023,
1028 n.* (1976) (White, J., concurring).
110. Wright v. United States, 519 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1975); O'Clair v. United States, 470
F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973).
111. "It may be concluded with satisfactory certainty that the jury, having convicted for
both offenses, would have convicted of robbery if it had been properly instructed." 96 S. Ct.
at 1028 (White, J., concurring).
112. One such troublesome aspect of the Act that could have been avoided by careful
drafting is the prevailing uncertainty as to whether the disjunctive language of subsection
(e) creates separate offenses. See note 62-71 supra & accompanying text,
113. See note 55 supra & accompanying text.
114. See note 56 supro & accompanying text.
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Prince,"5 Congress inserted the unlawful entry provision to cover a
person who enters a bank for the purpose of committing a felony but
is unsuccessful in completing the crime, it appears to be redundant
inasmuch as the statute as originally enacted proscribed not only
robbery, but attempted robbery as well." 6 The larceny provision
adopted in 1937," '7 however, did not make attempted larceny a
crime. The gap left between felonious entry and completed larceny
by the statutory language does not make sense. The only rational
inference to be drawn is that Congress intended the felonious entry
provision to be the equivalent of an attempted larceny provision." '
Moreover, interpreting the entry provision as punishing conduct
that does not even amount to an attempt would raise serious constitutional problems. Whether an unarmed person who enters a bank
during regular banking hours, intending to rob it, but who makes
no attempt to do so can be convicted under the entry provision of
the Act has never been expressly decided. "' If such conduct does not
amount to an overt act sufficient to constitute an attempt,'2 0 it is
questionable whether Congress can make it a crime. If such conduct
does amount to an overt act, it is covered by attempt law and the
entry provision is superfluous.
The assault language of subsection (d), unless it requires something more than the "force, violence and intimidation" of subsec115. 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957).
116. The statute as originally enacted, before the entry provision was added in 1937, provided: "Whoever, by force and violence, or by putting in fear, feloniously takes, or feloniously
attempts to take, from the person or presence of another . . . shall be imprisoned not more
than twenty years .... " 12 U.S.C. § 588(a) (1934), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970)
(emphasis supplied).
117. 12 U.S.C. § 588b(a) (1937), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1970).
118. The defendant in United States v. Foster, 478 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1973), argued that
the entry provision of the Act was essentially an attempted robbery offense requiring proof
of some overt act. Id. at 1004. The court, noting that no other court had decided such a
question, declined to rule on the issue. Id.
119. In Audett v. Johnston, 142 F.2d 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 743 (1944), the
court rejected the contention that the entry provision violated the Constitution on the ground
that the statute did not make it a crime merely to intend to commit larceny, but only
criminalized the intent to commit larceny when accompanied by and motivated by the overt
act of entry. Id. at 740. In Audett, however, the defendant had committed larceny as well as
entered with felonious intent; the case therefore is not dispositive of whether an entry with
felonious intent, unaccompanied by any other overt act (even carrying a dangerous weapon),
is punishable.
120. The court in United States v. Harrison, 522 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1975), noted that the
defendant, who had entered a bank intending to commit robbery, might not have been guilty
of attempted robbery had he withdrawn from the enterprise before committing the overt act
of drawing his pistol. Id. at 695.

1976]

BANK ROBBERY ACT

tion (a), also appears superfluous.' A comprehensive definition of
the term "assault" by Congress would have prevented the confusion. 2 ' Further, if Congress intended subsection (d) to require the
use of a dangerous weapon,' it should have included a provision
covering aggravated battery to ensure that a serious injury to a
person, by means other than a dangerous weapon, would receive
greater punishment than that provided under subsection (a).
CORRECTION OF ERRONEOUS CUMULATIVE SENTENCES-TRADITIONAL
THEORIES

The ambiguities in the Act have created considerable confusion
as the judiciary struggles with differing interpretations of the underlying offense of bank robbery. In particular, sentencing under the
Act manifests the difficulties courts have in understanding the purposes sought to be effectuated by this legislation.
Disparity in sentencing is acknowledged as a critical problem in
the federal criminal justice system.' The present structure is irrational and inconsistent, often occasioning punishment disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense.' Yet absent a gross abuse
of discretion 2 ' by the trial judge, appellate courts will not review
121. See notes 73-78 supra & accompanying text.
122. Congress could have provided a definition of assault for § 2113 purposes only, or it
could have provided a general assault definition for all of Title XVIII. This same lack of
definition extends, to some extent, to the other offenses under § 2113 that may accompany
the underlying robbery. "Reference could [have been] made . . . to a separate set of definitions for such common forms of aggravating conduct as assault, murder, and theft, thus
eliminating inconsistencies of definition and assuring that all the requisite elements of the
conduct, including the appropriate degree of culpability, would be clearly set forth." Note,
Piggyback Jurisdiction in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 81 YALE L.J. 1209, 1240
(1972). Inherent in any comprehensive definition of offenses, no matter how carefully drafted,
is the possibility that certain criminal conduct under the Act will not be covered appropriately by the definition. Id. at 1241.
123. See notes 73-82 supra & accompanying text.
124. A statement of the general theory of sentencing or of the forms of sentences available
for particular types of offenders appears nowhere in the present code. S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 893 (1975). For a general discussion of the critical problems resulting from
a lack of any coherent sentencing procedure see Stanton, Sentencing Provisions in Proposals
for a New FederalCriminal Code, 7 IND. L. REV. 348, 350 (1973); Comment, Present Limitations on Appellate Review of Sentencing-McGee v. United States, 58 IoWA L. REV. 469
(1972).
125. S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1975).
126. Cramer v. Wise, 501 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1974); Moore v. United States, 454 F.2d
286, 287 (6th Cir. 1972). The reasoning behind this marked deference to the trial court judge's
discretion is that sentencing is principally dependent upon matters within the knowledge,
experience, and judgment of he who tries the case. See Moore v. United States, 454 F.2d 287
(6th Cir. 1972).
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excessively harsh sentences.' 7 Sentences violative of a constitutional or statutory right, however, are subject to vacation and
correction.' Consequently, there have been many appeals of sentences'29 imposed under the Bank Robbery Act in contravention of
the Prince' mandate against cumulative sentences. Courts agree
that multiple sentencing constitutes error' 3 ' and that such error is
correctible,'32 rendering the judgment not void but merely voidable.' :' Courts have not developed a uniform method of curing the
erroneous sentences. Rather, they have developed three general
theories to govern appellate treatment of sentences invalidated
under Prince:'34 the exhaustion theory,'3 ' by which only the sentence
on the first count is retained; the merger theory,' by which only the
sentence imposed on the aggravated offense count is retained; and
127. United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 986 (4th Cir. 1974).
128. United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 986 (4th Cir. 1974); Cramer v. Wise, 501 F.2d
959, 962 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. McGhee, 488 F.2d 781, 786 (5th Cir, 1974); Rogers
v. United States, 304 F.2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. LoDuca, 274 F.2d 57, 59
(2d Cir. 1960).
129. These challenges, in which defendants have contested the legality of the sentences,
may come through direct appeal, a Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence, or a
post-conviction collateral attack under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. For a description of the differences
and interrelations of Federal Rule 35 and section 2255 motions to vacate or correct a sentence
see C. Wright, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 551-606 (1969). One notable difference is that
a Rule 35 motion reaches only errors in the sentence rendered under a valid conviction and
is not a means of reexamining errors occurring at the trial prior to the imposition of the
sentence, id. § 585, at 558, whereas the section 2255 remedy covers all grounds for collateral
attack on the conviction. Id. § 583, at 563. An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time
under either. Id. at 565.
130. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957); see notes 43-59 supra & accompanying
text.
131. Even before Prince courts generally agreed that multiple punishments for a single
bank robbery were impermissible. See, e.g., Ward v. United States, 183 F.2d 270, 272 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 864 (1950); Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380, 384-85 (1st
Cir. 1948); Coy v. Johnston, 136 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1943); and notes 13-15 supra &
accompanying text.
132. Gant v. United States, 161 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. 1947).
133. E.g., Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 306 (1961); United States v. Chester, 407
F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1969); McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 1031 (1968); Bayless v. United States, 347 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Leather, 271 F.2d 80, 86-87 (7th Cir. 1959); Campbell v. United States, 269
F.2d 688, 692 (1st Cir. 1959); Gant v. United States, 161 F.2d 793, 797 (5th Cir. 1947). See
Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 349 (1941), in which the Court asserted that the imposition
of multiple sentences for a single offense under the Bank Robbery Act was not fatal error.
134. The three approaches for ascertaining the valid sentences are described in United
States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 547 (3d Cir. 1971); and Sawyer v. United States, 312 F.2d 24,
26-27 (8th Cir. 1963).
135. See notes 138-40 infra & accompanying text.
136. See notes 141-45 infra & accompanying text.
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the judge's intent theory,'3 7 which indorses the right of courts to
declare either of the sentences valid.
The exhaustion theory, followed in only a few older cases,", was
based on the rationale that once a permissible sentence on the first
count was pronounced, the court had exhausted its power to sentence and could not thereafter act on the remaining counts. This
principle was discredited when the Supreme Court, in Green v:
United States,3 ' adhered to the judge's intent theory and allowed a
second (and longer) sentence to stand. 40
The merger theory, which assumes a merger of the nonaggravated offense into the aggravated,' has been applied only
when the sentence imposed on the aggravated offense was the more
severe.' When a heavier penalty was pronounced on a felonious
entry charge so that a merger of that count into the greater completed offense effectively would reward a defendant for having completed the offense,' courts have refused to apply the merger doctrine.4 4 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected this
137. See notes 146-51 infra & accompanying text.
138. Holbrook v. Hunter, 149 F.2d 230, 232 (10th Cir. 1945); United States v. Sims, 72 F.
Supp. 631, 632 (W.D. Mo. 1946). See also Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 349 (1941) in
which the Court conceded (without deciding the issue) that the defendant was correct in
asserting that only the sentence under count I was valid.
139. 365 U.S. 301 (1961).
140. Id. at 306. Apparently, whatever credibility the exhaustion doctrine may have had was
nullified by Green. United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 547 n.3 (3d Cir. 1971); Sawyer v.
United States, 312 F.2d 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1963).
141. Apparently this doctrine was derived in part from the merger language of Prince v.
United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957), in which the Court stated that the offense of entry merged
into the consummated crime of robbery. Id. at 328. See Gerberding v. United States, 471 F.2d
55, 62 (8th Cir. 1973).
The merger theory was applied by several pre-Prince cases as well. Gebhart v. Hunter, 184
F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1950); Remine v. United States, 161 F.2d 1020, 1021 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 862 (1947); Coy v. United States, 156 F.2d 293, 295 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 841 (1946).
142. See Coy v. United States, 156 F.2d 293, 295 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 841 (1946)
(decisions proclaiming that lesser degree of the offense merges with greater, if both are
charged in separate counts, must be viewed in light of practical fact that sentences imposed
in these cases were greater upon aggravated charge than upon other). Accord, United States
v. Welty, 468 F.2d 594, 595 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158, 166 (3d
Cir. 1969); United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808, 811 (3d Cir. 1969); Bayless v. United
States, 347 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Machibroda, 338 F.2d 947,949 (6th
Cir. 1964); United States v. Trumblay, 286 F.2d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1961).
143. Such an anomalous result is possible under the statute because the defendant may
receive 20 years and a $5000 fine under subsection (a) for entry with intent to commit a felony,
yet only 10 years and a $5000 fine under (b) for grand larceny or one year and a $1000 fine
for petit (under 100 dollars) larceny.
144. Whenever application of the doctrine would produce the incongruous result that one

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:101

doctrine as inconsistent with sound judicial policy. "5
A majority of courts"' apparently have adhered to the more flexible approach of retaining whichever sentence best reflects the intent
of the trial court.'47 Assuming that the sentencing judge sought to
impose at least as severe a penalty as that pronounced on any one
count,"' the courts following the intent theory invariably have vacated all but the longest sentence."' The underlying rationale is that
whose attempt is aborted may be punished with 20 years but one who actually fulfills his
intent receives only ten years or one year, "the right of the court . . . to simply vacate the
shorter sentence and allow the longer one to stand has been recognized." Hardy v. United
States, 292 F.2d 192, 194 (8th Cir. 1961). Accord, Sawyer v. United States, 312 F.2d 24, 28
(8th Cir. 1963); Williamson v. United States, 265 F.2d 236, 238 (5th Cir. 1959); Counts v.
United States, 263 F.2d 603, 604 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 920 (1959); LaDuke v.
United States, 253 F.2d 387, 389-90 (8th Cir. 1958); Purdom v. United States, 249 F.2d 822,
827 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 913 (1958); Kitts v. United States, 243 F.2d 883,
885 (8th Cir. 1957).
This practice is criticized by the dissent in Purdom v. United States, 249 F.2d 822 (10th
Cir. 1957), which states that the critical question is not the effect that application of the
doctrine of merger has upon the penalty but "whether the act of entering with the intent of
committing larceny merged into the completed act of stealing . . . . If appropriate application of the doctrine of merger leads to the undesired result of less punishment than might
otherwise be imposed, it is a matter to be corrected by Congress." Id. at 827-28 (Bratton, J.,
dissenting).
145. United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 547, 550 (3d Cir. 1971).
146. Those courts rejecting the merger theory if a heavier sentence was imposed on the
lesser charge resolved the problem by retaining the longer period of confinement. E.g., Sawyer
v. United States, 312 F.2d 24, 28-29 (8th Cir. 1963) (court vindicated judge's intention by
upholding larger sentence); Williamson v. United States, 265 F.2d 236, 238 (5th Cir. 1959)
(looked to Congress' purposes in drafting statute); Kitts v. United States, 243 F.2d 883, 885
(8th Cir. 1957) (trial court's intention was to subject defendant to maximum term of imprisonment).
147. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 519 F.2d 13, 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
285 (1975) (court clearly intended to sentence appellant for aggravated version of crime);
United States v. Vasquez, 504 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir. 1974) (by imposing concurrent sentences
judge intended maximum to be 15 years); United States v. Pietras, 501 F.2d 182, 188 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 660 (1974) (obvious intent of judge was to impose a sentence at
least equal to longest imposed); White v. United States, 419 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1969)
(remand for entry of sentence on whichever count trial court determines is appropriate vehicle
for effectuating jury's intent).
148. United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 551 (3d Cir. 1971). Significantly, the practical
effect of applying any of these doctrines is to impose the most severe penalty. In Miller v.
United States, 147 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1945), the court was unconcerned whether relief was
afforded appellant on the basis of merger, exhaustion, or judge's intent, stating it was immaterial which theory was applied as "the sentence imposed on each of the counts [wasi for
the same number of years." Id. at 374.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Welty, 468 F.2d 594, 595 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Foster, 440 F.2d 390, 393 (7th Cir. 1971); Jones v. United States, 396 F.2d 66, 68-69 (8th Cir.
1968); Bayless v. United States, 347 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1965); Lowe v. United States,
257 F.2d 409, 410 (6th Cir. 1958); Hewitt v. United States, 110 F.2d 1, 11 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied. 310 U.S. 641 (1940).
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an appellant should not profit unjustifiably from a mere technical
error by the trial court.""1 This doctrine seems inherently more reasonable and effective than the merger and exhaustion approaches
in assuring that the punishment is commensurate with the crime
and that it will not be affected by mere priority of pronouncement.''
Whenever the judge's intent is ascertainable a remand for resentencing is unnecessary; vacation of all sentences except that which
most closely approximates the trial court's intention is sufficient. 5"
If, however, the trial judge's misperception that petitioner was
guilty of separately punishable offenses may have significantly
affected the result, some courts decline to apply this procedure.,"
This is logical; the judge's intent theory is obviously inappropriate
whenever the judge's intent is unclear.'54
When not faced with the Prince problem of pyramided sentences for multiple convictions,
in which consecutive sentences may be imposed, a court that chooses to impose concurrent
sentences thereby refutes the conclusion that the imposition of the maximum sentence on
both evidences the judge's intent to impose the limit on defendant. See Natarelli v. United
States, 516 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1975).
150. "Sentencing should not be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner." King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1938), quoted in Coy
v. United States, 156 F.2d 293, 295 (6th Cir. 1946). Accord, Green v. United States, 365 U.S.
301, 306 (1961). The Court, in maintaining the longer sentence in Green, noted: "Plainly
enough, the intention of the district judge was to impose the maximum. . . twenty-five years
• . . and the formal defect in his procedure should not vitiate his considered judgment." Id.
Although this statement clearly manifests approval of the judge's intent theory, in United
States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1971), the court merely asserted that the Supreme
Court in Green "may, arguably, have endorsed [the court's intention] approach." Id. at 547
n.5.
151. Cf. O'Keith v. United States, 158 F.2d 591, 592 (5th Cir. 1946) (punishment should
not be dependent upon fortuity of priority in pronouncement of sentences).
152. See Gorman v. United States, 456 F.2d 1258, 1260 (2d Cir. 1972), in which the court
deemed a remand for resentencing to be "needlessly time consuming and a meaningless act,"
inasmuch as the judge's intent was "crystal clear." Id. An example of such an unnecessary
remand is found in United States v. Parson, 452 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1971), in which
the court ordered both sentences vacated and appellant resentenced on only the more aggravated count even though the original sentences had been equal and concurrent.
153. See Parker v. United States, 442 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (because sentences
for affirmed robbery convictions may have been influenced by impermissible entry convictions, proper remedy was remand for resentencing and vacation of entry convictions). Accord,
Bryant v. United States, 417 F.2d 555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
154. See Gerberding v. United States, 471 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir. 1973) (court forced to
remand for imposition of a general sentence because death of trial judge made it impossible
to ascertain his reasons for imposition of heavier penalties on lesser offenses).
The judge's intent theory may not be used to enhance a valid sentence after the defendant
has begun serving it. The court in United States v. Turner, 518 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1975),
observed that increasing a defendant's sentence would contravene the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, and held that even though the enhancement sought was for the
purpose of carrying out the intentions of the judge (as well as the expectation of the district
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AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH-REMAND FOR RESENTENCING AND
IMPOSITION OF A GENERAL SENTENCE

United States v. Corson
In United States v. Corson'55 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reviewed the sentencing problems arising under the Bank
Robbery Act and found the traditional theories for curing defective
sentences inadequate implementations of Prince.' The court re-

fused to interpret the merger language of Prince as restricting a
sentence to the most inclusive count, and instead construed Prince
as proscribing only cumulative penalties.'57 The court considered
the judge's intent approach defective because it failed to remedy the

principal dilemma created by Prince:maintaining appealable judgments on all counts, while complying with the Prince prohibition of
cumulative penalties.' Nor is this question resolved by suspending
sentence with probation;' 9 Corson viewed such a disposition to contravene Prince." Even assuming the validity of suspending sentattorney resulting from plea bargaining), an exception to the general prohibition of enhancement was unwarranted by the facts. Id. at 16. In United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615 (1970),
aff'd, 468 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1972), the court held that the result urged by the Government,
increasing the sentence under the remaining count to effectuate the intent of the judge, could
not be justified because such a result violated double jeopardy protection and also precluded
any future determination whether the judge would have imposed a greater sentence had he
realized that the maximum sentence allowable was 30 years, rather than the 80 years he
presumed it to be. Apparently the court in Welty would be willing to assume that the trial
court intended to impose a sentence equal to the most severe penalty pronounced.
Similarly, in Miller v. United States, 147 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1945), the court held that a valid
sentence could not be set aside and a more severe sentence imposed, for although the judge
"could have imposed on one count a sentence equal to the consecutive sentences he imposed
on the two, the matter may not be treated as though he had done so." Id. at 374.
155. 449 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1971).
156. Id. at 549-51.
157. 449 F.2d at 549-51. Further, the court condemned the merger doctrine as inconsistent
with sound judicial policy. Id. at 549.
158. Id. at 550. Imposition of sentence on each count is a prerequisite to an appealable
conviction, see Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937). Cases prior to Corson,
however, demonstrate that this principle is not adhered to rigidly. See notes 262-63 infra &
accompanying text.
159. This would be the minimum disposition upon which an appeal could be based, as a
suspension of sentence without probation is invalid. See United States v. Fried, 436 F.2d 784,
787 (6th Cir. 1971), cited in United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 550 (3d Cir. 1971).
160. 449 F.2d at 550. Cf. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 740 (3d Cir. 1970) (multiple
sentences constituted impermissible pyramiding notwithstanding all but one were suspended).
Arguably, because this sentencing procedure does not result in more severe punishment
than is allowed by Prince this type of sentence is a mere technical violation of that decision.
Compare Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 329 (1957) with Gorman v. United States,
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ence with probation on all but one count, Corson raised the objection that a reversal of the conviction upon which the non-suspended
sentence was imposed would leave only probation operative.",6
Moreover, as such a sentence is legal once it is final and affirmed
on appeal, it could not be modified under Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Most significantly, revocation of suspension of sentence absent2 a probation violation would infringe dou6
ble jeopardy immunity.

As an alternative to the merger and judge's intent theories,
Corson advocated imposing a general sentence on all counts for a
term not exceeding the limit of the count carrying the heaviest
penalty.' The court reasoned that this procedure would comply
456 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1972). Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declared
in United States v. Fried, 436 F.2d 784, 787 (1971), that suspension of imposition of sentence
was not even a technical violation of Prince. The court found support in section 3651 of the
Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970), reading it to mean that such a disposition was not a
sentence. Accord, Borelli v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 369, 370-71 (D. Conn. 1971). For
authority supporting this interpretation of probation see United States v. Fultz, 482 F.2d 1,
2 (8th Cir. 1973), and Zaroogian v. United States, 367 F.2d 959, 963 (1st Cir. 1966). But cf.
Nix v. United States, 131 F.2d 857, 858 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 771 (1943)
(probation involves a judgment of conviction even when the imposition of sentence is suspended). Use of the Probation Act for the purpose of avoiding Prince, however, ignores its
objective of awarding youthful or unhardened offenders a fresh start unburdened by a criminal stigma, see Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943). This application of the
"non-sentence" status accorded suspended sentences under the Probation Act is thus not
altogether satisfactory.
161. This result might be avoided by retrial if the reversal is without prejudice; otherwise,
reversal of the count upon which sentence was imposed does not permit reassignment of that
penalty to another, valid count. See, e.g., Pugliese v. United States, 353 F.2d 514 (1st Cir.
1965), affirming that the district court after appeal has no power to increase a sentence "not
infected by error." Id. at 516. As noted in United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615, 618 (3d Cir.
1970), an attack by a defendant on an illegal sentence cannot provide grounds under Rule 35
for reconsideration of the valid sentences on the other counts to afford the government the
same term of punishment as that originally imposed on all counts. Id. at 618.
162. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873) (Constitution designed as much
to prevent criminal from being twice punished for same offense as from being twice tried for
it); United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615, 618 (1970), afd, 468 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1972) (fifth
amendment prohibition against double jeopardy forbids government obtaining increase in
term of imprisonment under valid count to compensate for invalidity of sentences under
related counts). Cf. Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380, 385 (1st Cir. 1948) (cited in Corson
as corroborative of this contention but emphasizing the bar to subsequent prosecution rather
than multiple punishment).
If an unattached concurrent sentence remains after reversal of one count, courts, without
consideration of the double jeopardy implications, have changed the sentencing to run consecutively. See, e.g., United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615, 618 (1970), aff'd, 468 F.2d 594 (3d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Chester, 407 F.2d 53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1020 (1969);
Williamson v. United States, 265 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1959).
163. 449 F.2d at 551.
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with the Prince mandate yet would preclude the possibility of an
anomalous result in the event of a reversal of conviction on any one
count."' Following reversal, resentencing not exceeding the maximum allowed under any of the remaining counts would be permissible' 5 and would not engender double jeopardy problems as long as
the new sentence is no greater than the original term pronounced. '
The court in Corson was faced with invalid multiple sentencing;
the heaviest penalty was imposed on a lesser count. Rather than
arbitrarily designating one of the sentences valid, the court held
that the entire sentence had been tainted by the cumulative punishments and remanded for resentencing.1' Arguably, this disposition
of invalid multiple sentencing better protects the defendant because
he is entitled to be present at resentencing"5 and the trial court is
164. Id.
165. Id. For an example of an incorrect general sentence see United States v. Stewart, 523
F.2d 1263 (2d Cir. 1975), in which the district court had imposed a "general" sentence that
was the sum of the maximum penalties prescribed by each subsection.
166. Because a general sentence is not apportioned among the several counts, Vautrot v.
United States, 144 F.2d 740, 741 (8th Cir. 1944); Levine v. Hudspeth, 127 F.2d 982, 984 (10th
Cir. 1942), reimposition of the same sentence would not equal an increase in sentence even
though it covered fewer counts. See also United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931), which
affirms the power of courts to amend but not to increase sentences not because "the court
has lost control of the judgment in the latter case, but [becausel to increase the penalty is
to subject the defendant to double punishment.
... Id. at 307.
Illustrative of the limitations on a general sentence imposed upon remand is United States
v. Turner, 518 F.2d 14, 15 (7th Cir. 1975). One defendant had been sentenced to two ten year
consecutive sentences and the district court, after the sentence had been vacated and the
judgment remanded for resentencing, imposed a general sentence on the whole indictment
of 20 years. Despite the judge's clear intent to sentence the defendant to twenty years, the
appellate court held unwarranted this enhancement of a sentence the defendant had commenced to serve and consequently limited the general sentence to ten years. Id. at 16.
167. 449 F.2d at 551. Accord, e.g., United States v. Jasper, 481 F.2d 976, 979 (3d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Parker, 442 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Von Roeder,
435 F.2d 1004, 1010 (10th Cir. 1970); Coleman v. United States, 420 F.2d 616, 626 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Bryant v. United States, 417 F.2d 555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Butler v. United
States, 387 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D.R.I. 1975) (habeas corpus proceeding); Evans v. United
States, 386 F. Supp. 812, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
The dissent in Corson considered the majority's sentencing remedy illegal because more
than 120 days had passed since affirmance of the conviction and the court therefore had lost
jurisdiction to modify the valid sentence on the most aggravated third count. 449 F.2d at 55253 (Hastie, J., dissenting). Significantly, however, this assertion as to the validity of the third
and more inclusive count is dependent upon acceptance of the discounted merger theory. See
notes 138-40 supra & accompanying text.
168. As noted in Williamson v. United States, 265 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1959), a prisoner's
presence is not mandated for a decision whether a sentence should be set aside if no fact issue
is present, nor is it necessary if an invalid sentence on one count is vacated and another
reinstated. But a prisoner's presence is essential whenever a sentence is set aside and the
cause remanded for resentencing. Id. at 239.
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obligated to impose a new sentence based upon a reconsideration of
the case, rather than merely reinstating some part of the original
sentence.' 9 A majority of courts, however, continue to remedy defective sentencing by merely vacating invalid sentences and reinstating
the proper one.' 0
The General Sentence
A court may validly impose a general sentence upon conviction
of several counts charging different offenses provided that the term
of the sentence does not exceed the aggregate of maximum penalties
under each count."' For purposes of the Federal Bank Robbery Act,
Corson endorsed a variation of this principle by proposing a general
sentence not to exceed the maximum of the count carrying the
greatest penalty.' An appellate court will sustain such a sentence
as long as the defendant was convicted properly under any valid
169. Accord, United States v. Jasper, 481 F.2d 976, 979 (3d Cir. 1973) (Corson approach of
remanding for resentencing on the whole judgment and in presence of defendant is expressly
accepted).
170. See, e.g., Goodman v. United States, 511 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Pravato, 505 F.2d 703, 705 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Leyba, 504 F.2d 441, 444 (10th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975); United States v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045, 105355 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Vasquez, 504 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Cooper, 504 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Pietras, 501 F.2d 182, 188 (8th
Cir. 1974); Garza v. United States, 498 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. United
States, 485 F.2d 1352, 1355 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Mackey, 474 F.2d 55, 57 (4th
Cir.), cert, denied, 412 U.S. 941 (1973); United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361, 363 (4th Cir.
1972); United States v. Buck, 449 F.2d 262, 271 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Foster, 440
F.2d 390, 393 (7th Cir. 1971); Holland v. United States, 384 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Gardner, 347 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Machibroda,
338 F.2d 947, 949 (6th Cir. 1964).
Prior to Corson, however, courts that remanded for resentencing merely vacated the erroneous sentences rather than asserting the infirmity of the entire sentence, and generally did
so without requiring the defendant to be present. See, e.g., United States v. Parson, 452 F.2d
1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Parker, 442 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United
States v. Foy, 441 F.2d 398, 399 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. White, 440 F.2d 978, 982
(5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1010-11 (10th Cir. 1970); Coleman v. United States, 420 F.2d 616, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Bryant v. United States, 417 F.2d
555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
171. 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 416 (1969). See, e.g,, Davis v. United
States, 269 F.2d 357, 363 (6th Cir. 1959); Call v. United States, 265 F.2d 167, 171 (4th Cir.
1959); Hamilton v. United States, 204 F.2d 927, 928 (4th Cir. 1953); McDowell v. Swope, 183
F.2d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 1950); Reed v. United States, 142 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1944); Levine v.
Hudspeth, 127 F.2d 982, 984 (10th Cir. 1942).
172. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 431 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Fannon, 403 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1968); Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 733 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962); United States v. Haith, 297 F.2d 65, 68 (4th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 804 (1962); Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380, 386 (1st Cir. 1948).
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count that warrants judgment and sentence.'
The general sentence has not been favored, however; courts prefer
separate sentences on each count.'7 4 Some circuits have struck
down'7 5 or specifically disapproved 7 ' general sentences. The predominant criticism of such a sentence is that a prisoner's right to
specific punishment for specific transgressions is undermined by
"inscrutable mystery" regarding the real sentence and thus his rehabilitation is impeded. 7 The type of general sentence approved in
Corson appears less vulnerable to this objection, however, as its
limitation to the maximum allowed by the most aggravated count
does require reference to a specific offense. "' Furthermore, because
multiple convictions arising under the Act necessarily require the
underlying offense of bank robbery, there is less likelihood of confusion regarding the precise crime for which defendant is being punished. "I
173. "[Tihe presumption of law is that the court awarded sentence on the good count
only." Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140, 147 (1891). Accord, Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 115 (1959); United States v. Sheehan, 428 F.2d 67, 79 (8th Cir.), cert,
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); United States v. Lewis, 406 F.2d 486, 492 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 1013 (1969); Reed v. United States, 401 F.2d 756, 758 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 1021 (1969); Vautrot v. United States, 144 F.2d 740, 741 (8th Cir. 1944).
174. Ray v. United States, 372 F.2d 80, 83 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Haith, 297 F.2d
65, 68 (4th Cir. 1961); Davis v. United States, 269 F.2d 357, 363 (6th Cir. 1959); McDowell v.
Swope, 183 F.2d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 1950); Reed v. United States, 142 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1944);
Levine v. Hudspeth, 127 F.2d 982, 984 (10th Cir. 1942).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Straite, 425 F.2d 594, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Walker v.
United States, 342 F.2d 22, 27 (5th Cir. 1965); Benson v. United States, 332 F.2d 288 (5th
Cir. 1964). But cf. Stephen v. United States, 426 F.2d 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1970), which suggests
that pyramiding of sentences is permissible as long as the total does not exceed the maximum
allowable on the most aggravated count. As this is effectively a general sentence, it is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit purportedly has outlawed general sentences.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Yoppolo, 435 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1970); Peoples v.
United States, 412 F.2d 5, 7 (8th Cir. 1969). ,
177. Benson v. United States, 332 F.2d 288, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1964). Accord, United States
v. Straite, 425 F.2d 594, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Both of these courts emphasized that this defect
in the general sentence does not taint the underlying conviction and is not subject to collateral
attack. The only relief available is correct sentencing. 332 F.2d at 292 n.10; 425 F.2d at 596
n.5.
178. The court in Benson, which outlawed the general sentence within the Fifth Circuit,
was particularly concerned with a general sentence that was less than the aggregate of the
maximums of all counts but greater than the allowable penalty under only one count. A
Corson general sentence arguably is related more closely to a specific offense and therefore
less "mysterious" to the defendant.
179. See Hall v. United States, 356 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1966), holding the Benson rule
inapplicable to bank robbery cases. Analytical inconsistencies in Hall detract from its significance as a modification of Benson, however. The defendant was convicted of felonious entry
and larceny and was given a general sentence of fifteen years. Reading Prince to mandate a

1976]

BANK ROBBERY ACT

An additional criticism of the general sentence is that it may
impede judicial efficiency on motions for post-conviction relief.8 0
Remand for resentencing will be required whenever the most aggravated count is reversed'"' and perhaps also when the sentencing
judge may have been influenced by the multiplicity of offenses,
some of which are later held erroneous.' 2 A possible solution for
avoiding the resentencing problems is to impose a general sentence
equal to the "minimum maximum"-the lowest maximum permitted on any of the counts. For example, if the defendant is convicted
for entry (20 years), grand larceny (ten years), and assault with a
dangerous weapon (25 years) the general sentence imposed would be
ten years. Such a proposal is inadvisable, however, because it is
violative of the legislative intent to impose a sentence commensurate with criminal culpability, and it would produce results as anomalous as does the discredited merger theory.' 3
In the Third Circuit, which decided Corson, remanding for imposition of a general sentence with the defendant present is now the
rule for correction of improperly cumulated consecutive or concurrent sentences;' 4 in the Fifth" 5 and Eighth' 8 Circuits general senmerger of the offenses, the appellate court determined that a single crime had been proven
upon which a valid single sentence had been imposed. The distinction between robbery and
larceny relative to felonious entry, see notes 55-56 supra & accompanying text, was ignored
and the merger theory was misapplied by the court's permitting the fifteen year sentence to
stand despite the lesser maximum (ten years) of the completed offense provision.
The theory, illustrated in Hall, that the Act creates only one substantive crime with alternative means of commission has developed from an extension of the Prince merger language
to the other sections of the statute, see notes 255-61 infra & accompanying text. Difficulty
may arise in the application of this interpretation to cases of (e) [2] and (3] kidnapping
and murder, however, because these offenses may be deemed conceptually distinct from the
underlying bank robbery, see notes 69-71 supra & accompanying text.
180. Benson v. United States, 332 F.2d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1964). The need to reexamine
all counts if error is asserted and to order a resentencing if any court cannot stand, a problem
stressed in Benson, is not applicable to Corson general sentences, which are restricted to the
maximum allowable on the most aggravated count.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Straite, 425 F.2d 594, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States
v. Jones, 397 F. Supp. 312, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (in a bank robbery case the general sentence
often would be illegal as to all counts except the count under subsection (d)).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Straite, 425 F.2d 594, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Baber v. United
States, 324 F.2d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Griffin v. United States, 269 F.2d 903, 906 (4th
Cir. 1959). This deficiency was not mentioned in Benson.
183. For example, if a defendant were convicted of entering with intent to commit both
larceny and petit larceny he would receive only a one year general sentence. If the statute,
however, had been drafted so that the lesser crime of entering did not carry a penalty equal
to that of robbery and much longer than that of larceny, the application of the merger theory
could be warranted.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Jasper, 481 F.2d 976, 979 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
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tences have been permitted in bank robbery cases. A majority of
circuits, however, have failed to adopt the Corson procedure.'8 7 Furthermore, courts that have endorsed the use of the general sentence
in bank robbery cases have not treated a remand for resentencing
as mandatory. For example, in Gorman v. United States," the Second Circuit expressly endorsed Corson as a sensible way to resolve
the dilemma, created by Prince, of avoiding the pyramiding of sentences while retaining final appealable convictions on all counts.
Nevertheless, the court in Gorman refused to remand for resentencing because the judge's intent was absolutely clear." 9 In the circuits
that maintain that multiple convictions are permissible, the
Gorman approach is practical as well as valid, for the court there
adopted a more flexible approach for curing defective sentences.
Under Gorman, the invalid sentence simply is vacated and the valid
one is reinstated if the judge's intent is clear and a remand would
Chapman, 448 F.2d 1381, 1388 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Overton v. United States,
405 U.S. 929 (1972); Evans v, United States, 386 F. Supp. 812, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1974). But see
United States v. Welty, 468 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1972). The appellate court noted that prior to
its decision in Corson they had ordered three of the four bank robbery sentences vacated,
allowing the one under subsection (d) to stand as originally imposed. Id. at 595. The court
found nothing in this order to be inconsistent with Corson. Presumably the court so declared
because their focus was on the district court's decision to render an unattached concurrent
sentence consecutive, rather than on the question of resentencing in open court. Still, a
conflict with Corson and Jasper seems apparent. Although Corson dealt with consecutive
sentences, its application has been extended to cases involving concurrent sentences as well.
See United States v. Jasper, 481 F.2d 976 (3d Cir. 1973); Evans v. United States, 386 F. Supp.
812 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
185. Hall v. United States, 356 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1966).
186. Johnson v. United States, 495 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1974). The court reasoned that a
single general sentence was proper because under the federal statute a consummated bank
robbery could violate several sections of the Act but Prince precluded the imposition of
separate sentences for each violation. Johnson's significance as authority for the general
sentence approach is lessened, however, by its reliance on Gerberding v. United States, 471
F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1973). The Gerberdingcourt was unable to discern the trial judge's purpose
in imposing more severe penalties on the lesser offenses. A further complication was the
judge's death after the trial. Under these unusual circumstances the appellate court felt
compelled to remand for imposition of a general sentence. The court expressly stated, however, that the remand should not be viewed as a departure from the judge's intent theory
heretofore endorsed by the court.
187. See Wright v. United States, 519 F.2d 13, 18 (7th Cir. 1975). But cf. Argo v. United
States, 473 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973). Argo considered multiple
convictions (as distinguished from multiple sentences, as in Corson) technically improper.
The defendant had been convicted under subsections (a) and (d) and sentenced to 25 years,
the maximum allowable under (d). Although this was in effect a Corson-type general sentence, equal to the maximum allowed on the most aggravated count, the court held there was
no prejudicial error and did not remand for resentencing.
188. 456 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1972).
189. Id. at 1259.
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be needlessly time consuming and meaningless. 9 " The difficulty
with this approach is that it is not always valid to assume that a
court, by imposing the maximum sentence on each count, intended
the longest sentence to stand, for the judge's misperception of the
permissibility of multiple sentences may have influenced the term
imposed.
Conclusion
The merger theory, under which only the sentence on the most
inclusive offense is retained, is inadequate under the Act because
the lesser offense of entry may carry a greater penalty than the
completed crime. 9 ' Although the suspension of sentence with probation technically avoids cumulative sentencing without immunizing
the defendant from punishment upon reversal of the sentence supporting conviction, it contravenes the spirit and purpose of the Probation Act and is unwarranted.'92 Disregarding the adverse collateral consequences of multiple convictions, 9 ' the Corson general
sentence, limited by the maximum allowed on any valid count,
,appears the most practical way at the district court level to preserve
-convictionsfor appeal without cumulating sentences. The disadvantages of the general sentence are lack of specificity'9 4 and time con:suming resentencing upon reversal of one or more counts.'95 Yet,
under the prevalent interpretation of Prince as prohibiting only
multiple sentences and not multiple convictions, it seems to be the
most practical implementation.
THE EFFECT OF CONCURRENT SENTENCING

Although not affirmatively advocating this procedure as a solution to the Prince dilemma, some courts' nevertheless have ap190. Id. at 1260.
191. See notes 143-45 supra & accompanying text.
192. See note 160 supra.
193. See notes 210-13 and note 238 infra & accompanying text.
194. See notes 177-79 supra & accompanying text.
195. See notes 180-82 supra & accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Spears, 442 F.2d 424, 425 (4th Cir. 1971); McMillen v.
United States, 386 F.2d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968); United
States v. Jones, 397 F. Supp. 312, 315-16 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Other cases have reached the same
result by vacating erroneous concurrent sentences subsequent to affirmation of convictions
on appeal, but without explicit endorsement of this practice. See, e.g., United States v.
Stewart, 513 F.2d 957, 960-61 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Pravato, 505 F.2d 703, 705 (2d
Cir. 1974).
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proved the imposition by the trial judge of multiple concurrent sentences. An appellate court can correct this technical error by vacating all but one sentence when the conviction becomes final after
appeal." 7 Various rationales for this practice have been enunciated.
It is a practical means for preserving a final appealable judgment
on all convictions while at the same time insuring valid verdicts and
the authority to sentence correctly on remand."'s Moreover, the defendant is not harmed as long as the time to be served does not
exceed the maximum allowable under the most aggravated count. 9 ,
Courts also have justified multiple concurrent sentences by reading
Prince narrowly to prohibit only multiple consecutive sentences.2° '
The concurrent sentence doctrine of appellate review, whereby a
court may decline even to review' the separate counts of a multicount indictment as long as some of the counts were valid,' 2 may
further affect the Prince mandate against cumulative sentences.
Thus the formal defect of multiple sentences would not require vacation of the lesser sentences. 3 Because the imposition of concurrent sentences is not reversible error,0 4 courts deeming the lesser
197. As observed in Corson, such a procedure necessitates a correction of every sentence
and implicitly approves the original, conscious imposition of an improper sentence. 449 F.2d
at 551 n.15.
198. United States v. Spears, 442 F.2d 424, 425 (4th Cir. 1971) (by implication); United
States v. Jones, 397 F. Supp. 312, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
199. McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 1967). But see discussion of
collateral consequences of concurrent sentences notes 211-221 infra & accompanying text. A
defendant thus would not be able to avoid serving any term of imprisonment because on
appeal only the conviction supporting a prison sentence was reversed. The First Circuit,
however, later held in O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 921 (1973), that not only multiple convictions but also multiple sentences were
disallowed under the statute. To.reconcile these inconsistent decisions the court in O'Clair
noted that in McMillen it merely had assumed the validity of multiple convictions. Id. at
1203 n.4. See notes 226-43 infra & accompanying text.
200. McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 1967). See also Campbell v.
United States, 269 F.2d 688, 692 (1st Cir. 1959). But see United States v. Von Roeder, 435
F.2d 1004, 1010-11 (10th Cir. 1970); Coleman v. United States, 420 F.2d 616, 626 (D.C. Cir.
1969); United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158, 166 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 994
(1970).
201. Compare discussion notes 196-200 supra & accompanying text regarding cases that
ultimately vacated the erroneous cumulative sentences.
202. This practice was implicitly endorsed for bank robbery cases by the Supreme Court
in Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1961).
203. Id. Cf. Sullivan v. United States, 485 F.2d 1352, 1355 (5th Cir. 1973) (court chose to
vacate erroneous sentence and leave effective valid sentence in mistaken reliance on Green).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 138 (1965); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 115 (1959); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359 (1958); Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943).
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sentences harmless may refuse to upset them.'"5 Courts following
this practice hold, in effect, that the defect resulting from the multiplicity is vitiated by the imposition of concurrent sentences."' In
applying the doctrine, some courts have stated emphatically that
the judgment "will not be reversed," ' 7 while others have advised
20 8
less assertively that it "may be affirmed.9
The Supreme Court in Benton v. Maryland, however, undermined the concurrent sentence doctrine. 08 The Court held that the
existence of a valid concurrent sentence did not constitute a jurisdictional bar to review of the conviction on one count, because the
possibility of adverse collateral consequences provided the necessary elements of a justiciable case or controversy. t 0 The possible
consequences from multiple convictions included enhancement of
sentence under habitual criminal statutes, impairment of chances
for parole, and impeachment of character as a witness.2 1 ' Although
205. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 269 F.2d 688,-692 (lst Cir. 1959), vacated on
other grounds, 365 U.S. 85 (1961).
206. See, e.g., Ward v. United States, 183 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
864 (1950).
207. United States v. LePera, 443 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971).
See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 115 (1959) (must be upheld if any count
is good); Schutz v. United States, 432 F.2d 25, 29 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S, 1002
(1971) (if sentence does not exceed that which might be lawfully imposed upon any one valid
count, judgment and sentence remain in full force regardlessof disposition of other counts);
Glazerman v. United States, 421 F.2d 547, 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970)
(judgment and sentence will not be reversed if sentence does not exceed that which may be
lawfully imposed on valid counts).
208. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 n.6 (1957) (may be affirmed if conviction
on either count valid).
209. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The rule has not, however, been abolished. United States v.
Holman, 436 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 913 (1971). For other cases
applying the doctrine after Benton see Morrison v. United States, 491 F.2d 344, 347 (8th Cir.
1974); United States v. Johnson, 469 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hamilton,
469 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Crouch, 442 F.2d 427, 427-28 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 959 (1971).
210. 395 U.S. at 790-91. Accord, United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1010 (10th
Cir. 1970), vacated on other grounds, sub nom. Schreiner v. United States, 404 U.S. 67 (1971),
(justiciable case or controversy existed although time served was not affected; illegal sentence
vacated with remand for resentencing on remaining count). See also Note, The Federal
Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1099, 1117 (1970) (concurrent sentence
doctrine after Benton clearly abrogated as a mandatory device for automatic dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds).
211. 395 U.S. at 790-91. See Cramer, Concurrent Sentence Doctrine Limited, 36 D.C. BAR
J. 46 (1969) (adverse consequences include possibility that officials or other persons considering defendant's record in the future, whether for purposes of parole, employment, impeachment as witness, etc., may consider the two convictions as relating to separate criminal
activities). See also Comment, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 385 (1971).
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refusing to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine to bar review in
this case, the Supreme Court failed to enunciate clearly the amount
of prejudice that subsequent defendants must show to warrant this
relief." The Court did note that collateral legal consequences are
entailed in most convictions," 3 thus implying a marked restriction
of the doctrine's applicability. It further acknowledged, however,
that the doctrine may have continuing validity as a rule of judicial
convenience allowing courts in certain circumstances, and as a matter of discretion," 4 to decide that it is not necessary to review the
challenged convictions."'5 By admitting that situations may arise in
which the adverse consequences are so remote that prejudice to the
defendant is de minimis, the Court seemingly advocated a rule of
judicial discretion for partial review."'
Some courts have suggested that the impact of Benton is that the
appellant must demonstrate some undesirable collateral consequences to avoid application of the doctrine, 17 or conversely, that
212. As the court in United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1019 (1970), stated: "[Tlhe Court in Benton did not resolve the question of whether
prejudice beyond that inherent in being convicted of two offenses and serving two sentences
therefor, albeit concurrently, must be shown to obtain relief.
... Id. at 811.
213. 395 U.S. at 790.
214. Id. at 791.
215. Id. In the dissent, two Justices stressed that the rule does have continuing validity as
an element of judicial discretion because it saves overworked courts from reviewing convictions that will have no significant adverse consequences for the appellant. Id. at 801-02
(Harlan & Stewart, J.J., dissenting). The dissent has a valid point; courts should not expend
their time considering inconsequential problems. It may be difficult, however, for an appellant to prove convincingly that these multiple convictions, though not presently prejudicial,
may be so in the future. Neither the majority nor the dissent expressed a view on whether
collateral consequences (e.g., a recidivist sentence ten years later) may constitutionally be
imposed because of a conviction that was denied review based on the concurrent sentence
doctrine. This potential problem is an additional argument against using the doctrine.
216. In United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1958), decided prior to Benton, the
court asserted that the Supreme Court had made it clear that the rule is not absolute but
rather is a matter of discretion. The reason for review of concurrent counts in some cases was
the court's suspicion that "the total sentences would be less if the convictions were shorn of
the defective counts." Id. at 563. The Hines court also noted adverse effects on parole, the
resultant social stigma, and the possibility that a longer sentence might have been imposed.
Id. For a statement that this court was thus espousing a rule of judicial discretion for partial
review of multi-count convictions in place of automatic dismissal, see Note, CriminalProcedure-Appeal May Be Taken to One Count of Multi-Count Conviction Where Concurrent
Sentences Have Been Imposed, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 726, 729 (1959).
217. United States v. Febre, 425 F.2d 107, 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
See also Morrison v. United States, 491 F.2d 344, 347 (8th Cir. 1974) (collateral legal consequences that might result from the added convictions were remote); Tarvestad v. United
States, 418 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970) (rule "still viable
where prejudice does not patently appear and collateral legal consequences are remote.")
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prejudice is presumed to exist unless the government clearly proves
otherwise.21s In view of the Court's declaration that collateral consequences attach to most convictions, the latter interpretation seems
the more reasonable."' As those courts refusing to invoke the doctrine maintain, whenever multiple sentences are impermissible the
error is not cured by the existence of concurrent sentences;22 although the potential prejudice to a defendant is less than with consecutive sentences it is not eliminated.'
Courts have found sufficient prejudice to merit review of multiple
concurrent sentences when there were such potential collateral consequences as enhancement of sentence under recidivist statutes, 2
impeachment of character as a witness,2 2 and impairment of opportunity for parole. 2 4 Furthermore, courts have considered challenges
(citation omitted). Cf. United States v. Holman, 436 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1970) (overwhelming evidence and extremely low sentence, not defendant's failure to demonstrate prejudice, were seemingly determinative).
218. See United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (doctrine perhaps may be
applied whenever collateral consequences can be ruled out definitely, implying need for
positive proof of no adverse effects); Note, The Federal Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1099, 1117 (1970) (great probability that prejudice will result strongly suggests
federal appellate courts should review all counts of conviction unless government can demonstrate affirmatively that no prejudice will occur).
219. See United States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (after Benton it cannot be
assumed that multiplicity of concurrent sentences will not have adverse consequences for
appellant).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Mori, 444 F.2d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
White, 440 F.2d 978, 982 (5th Cir. 1971) (ordering vacation of sentence followed by remand
for resentencing on one count). Cf. Holland v. United States, 384 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1967)
(merely vacated erroneous sentence).
221. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 519 F.2d 13, 19-20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.
Ct. 285 (1975) (where possibility of undesirable consequences exists no longer obliged to follow
rule and may consider challenges); United States v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045, 1053-55 (7th Cir.
1974) (illegal sentences must be vacated if appellant may be prejudiced); United States v.
Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972) (may review erroneous
sentence where possibility of adverse consequences exists). Moreover, according to the court
in United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1970), "[tlhe vacation of the judgment
does not destroy the jury verdict, but is rather equivalent in practical effect to a suspension
of the imposition of sentence. If it later develops that the interest of justice so requires, the
sentence can be reimposed on a concurrent basis. The conviction could then be subject to
appellate review." Id. at 606, n.8.
222. See, e.g., United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808, 811 (3d Cir. 1969) (possibility that
appellant might some day be subject to habitual criminal statute constituted sufficient
prejudice).
223. United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
224. See, e.g., Clermont v. United States, 432 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1970); Holland v.
United States, 384 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Machibroda, 338 F.2d 947,
949 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v. Leather, 271 F.2d 80, 85 (7th Cir. 1959); Hibdon v.
United States, 204 F.2d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 1953). But see Clark v. United States, 267 F.2d 99,
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to multiple sentences if, in the exercise of their discretion, they felt
that the length of the sentences or verdicts on other counts was
influenced by the evidence presented on the erroneous counts, or by
the judge's view that the defendant was guilty of separately punishable offenses.22 ' Although the standard for judging the prejudicial
effects of concurrent sentences is still unclear, Benton establishes
that a court may not disregard the possibility of collateral consequences resulting from multiple convictions.
THE O'CLAIR DOCTRINE-DISALLOWANCE OF MULTIPLE CONVICTION
WELL

As

As

MULTIPLE SENTENCES

Adverse collateral consequences were also pivotal to the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in O'Clair v. United
5 that a correct interpretation of the Act required expunging
States"'
not only multiple sentences but also multiple convictions. 2 1 Thus,
in contrast to the Corson conclusion that only multiple sentences
are forbidden, 2 8 O'Clair mandated, in an apparent departure from
prior bank robbery cases,229 that for the aggravated offense only one
102 (4th Cir. 1959) (eligibility for parole not affected; determined by length of term of imprisonment and not by number of sentences imposed). See also 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970) ("[al
Federal prisoner ...
may be released on parole after serving one third of such term or terms
. . . .
.).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Rizzo, 491 F.2d 1235, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974) (court remanded
for reconsideration of sentence because conviction on both counts might have affected punishment set for each). But see United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1970) (court
refused to remand for resentencing after vacation of convictions under § 2113(d) finding, as
sentences imposed were well within maximum authorized, no evidence that sentences were
influenced by guilty verdicts on more serious charge).
226. 470 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973).
227. Id. at 1204.
228. 449 F.2d 544, 551 (3d Cir. 1971).
229. As noted in O'Clair, 470 F.2d at 1202 n.2, prior cases appear to have assumed the
validity of multiple convictions under subsections (a), (b), and (d) and thus did not decide
directly the present issue. See also United States v. Harvey, 439 F.2d 142, 143 (3d Cir. 1971)
(as separate crimes are created, court can convict on both counts); Matlock v. United States,
309 F. Supp. 398, 401 (W.D. Tenn. 1970) (offenses maintain their separate identity, therefore,
multiple convictions are allowed). But see Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 994 (4th Cir. 1972),
a case dealing with violations of subsections (a) and (d). The court stated that the sections
created one offense but referred only to the illegality of multiple sentences, holding that the
defendant therefore was entitled to have one of his convictions vacated. It appears that the
judge was simply imprecise in his language and was not anticipating the holding in O'Clair
that multiple convictions are forbidden. Additionally, some courts have vacated both the
entering sentence and conviction in implementation of the Prince rationale that the entering
with intent offense merges into the completed robbery. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 442
F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Coleman v. United States, 420 F.2d 616, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Bryant v. United States, 417 F.2d 555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Cf. United States v. Buck, 449
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conviction would be permitted. 3 The decision was grounded on a
consideration not only of the probable collateral effects of multiple
convictions but also of pertinent legislative history, the rule of lenity, and double jeopardy problems.3
Although under the same evidence test Congress constitutionally
could impose multiple punishments for some of the components of
bank robbery,232 the court in O'Clairexamined the relevant committee report and found that Congress intended to create not separate
offenses but "one offense-bank robbery-which was to receive one
punishment, its severity determined by the nature of the accompanying aggravating circumstances." 3 Thus the court reasoned that
if Congress intended the aggravating incidents to affect only the
sentence, it necessarily would follow that Congress did not intend
the existence of such incidents to double the convictions." 4 Moreover, because the statute is ambiguous, failing to establish clearly
either a single offense with alternative means of commission2 ' or
distinct crimes for which multiple punishments are allowed,23 the
rule of lenity required adoption of the less severe approach. 37
To further bolster its proposition that multiple convictions must
be disallowed, the court noted the harmful collateral effects of convictions on a second count in the same indictment, including inF.2d 262, 271 (10th Cir. 1971) (vacation of sentence and conviction following puzzling conclusion that larceny merged into the entering offense).
230. 470 F.2d at 1204.
231. The O'Clair court also found support in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Prince v. United States, 230 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1956), that when one is charged
with committing or attempting to commit an offense defined in subsections (a) or (b) and
also with the aggravating offense as is defined in subsection (d), only one conviction will
stand. 470 F.2d at 1201-02.
232. See notes 15-18 supra & accompanying text.
233. 470 F.2d at 1202. H.R. REP. No. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). In support of the
contention that the Act creates one offense, the then Attorney General in his letter incorporated into the report described the sections thus: "If (d) is committed the penalty is increased
"
to . . . .

234. 470 F.2d at 1202.
235. The court suggested that a statute prescribing more severe penalties for the offense
described "if death results" or "ifpersonal injury results" would evince the creation of a single
offense. Id. Compare the explanation of the statute found in H.R. REP. No. 1461, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1934) (If (d) committed, penalty is increased to . . .).
This type of statute was
criticized in Note, Piggyback Jurisdiction in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 81 YALE
L.J. 1209, 1230 (1972), which nonetheless praised the scheme of the Bank Robbery Act.
236. This was the approach taken in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code §§ 201(b), 1721,
and 1612, Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
(1971).
237. For a discussion of this rule of statutory construction see notes 23-25 supra & accompanying text.
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creased sentences under the habitual offender statutes, impeachment of character as a witness, and the "extra stigma imposed upon
one's reputation." ' The double jeopardy problems inherent in dual
convictions for one offense provided additional corroboration of the
O'Clair interpretation, the court reasoning that if a state cannot
constitutionally obtain two convictions for the same act at separate
trials, it also cannot do so at the same trial.23
In declaring multiple convictions, as well as sentences, illegal, the
court rejected the contention that convicting on all counts is justifiable because it insures an appealable judgment and prevents a miscarriage of justice.24 As the court noted, this argument fails to recognize that the double jeopardy clause does not bar reprosecution after
reversal on appeal,24 and that reversible error generally will infect
both counts.242 Acknowledging that using two counts might be more
efficient than a retrial, the court nevertheless asserted affirmatively
that "administrative convenience [could] not justify infringement
of constitutional rights."214
238. 470 F.2d at 1203. See notes 210-13 supra & accompanying text. In United States v.
Borrelli, 333 F. Supp. 369 (D. Conn. 1971), the court ultimately allowed multiple convictions
to stand yet acknowledged "that the practical effect which flows from the two interpretations
is not de minimis since under the 'merger of sentences' concept the convictions are allowed
to stand and may affect a possible subsequent sentence under many habitual criminal statutes or may impair a prisoner's opportunities for pardon or parole." Id. at 370.
239. 470 F.2d at 1203. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-19 (1969);
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307-09 (1931); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163,
173 (1873); United States v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368, 369 (2d Cir. 1966).
The court in O'Clairwas confronted with dictum in Holiday v. Johnson, 313 U.S. 342, 349
(1941), to the effect that the erroneous imposition of two sentences for a single offense does
not equal double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit interpreted this statement narrowly to mean only that a sentence invalid under the statute is not grounds for
upsetting the underlying conviction via collateral attack. 470 F.2d at 1204 n.5. The court
further noted that the Supreme Court's statement was accompanied by no explanation and
that strong precedent both before and after, see cases cited note 131 supra, mandated a
restricted reading of it.
240. 470 F.2d at 1203. Interestingly, McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1967),
expressed this exact concern, but, as observed in O'Clair, 470 F.2d at 1203 n.4, the court in
McMillen assumed the very point at issue in O'Clair-thevalidity of multiple convictions.
241. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969):
At least since 1896 . . . it has been settled that this constitutional guarantee
imposes no limitations whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has
succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside. ...
A new trial may result in an acquittal. But if it does result in a conviction,
we cannot say that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy of its
own weight restricts the imposition of an otherwise lawful single punishment
....
Id. at 719-21 (citation omitted).
242. 470 F.2d at 1204.
243. Id.
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Although only the Seventh Circuit 44 appears to have expressly
followed O'Clair'sholding that principles of statutory construction,
collateral consequences, and double jeopardy necessitate vacation
of convictions for all but the greater inclusive offense,245 the Supreme Court in United States v. Gaddis245 apparently has endorsed
the O'Clair approach for drafting indictments and charging the
jury: 47 in a multi-count indictment each count should be considered
not separately but seriatim,4 8 thus resulting in only one conviction.
In contrast to the First and Seventh Circuits, most courts construe Prince as holding that multiple convictions, but not multiple
sentences, may stand. 49 Their imprecise and contradictory language
indicates that these courts seemingly assumed the validity of multi244. Wright v. United States, 519 F.2d 13, 19 (7th Cir. 1975). As observed in Wright the
issue of the illegality of the multiple convictions under the Bank Robbery Act appears not to
have been determined by any of the Courts of Appeals until O'Clair. Wright incorrectly.
interpreted Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959), however, as having decided sub
silentio the question of multiple convictions because the court in Heflin concurred with the
petitioner's claim that he could not lawfully receive multiple convictions under subsections
(c) and (d) of the Act. Id. at 19. This holding is not determinative of the present situation
because (c) and (d) are separate, mutually exclusive offenses that cannot be committed by
the same person, whereas (a), (b), and (d) are merely different ways of committing the same
offense of bank robbery. In following O'Clair, Wright also considered the double jeopardy
problems and adverse collateral effects presented by more than one conviction. In addition
to adopting the O'Clair rationale for construing the statute as outlawing multiple convictions,
Wright also proposed the same method for convicting under a permissible multi-count indictment. 519 F.2d at 19-20.
245. Butler v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 1375 (D.R.I. 1975) (habeas corpus proceeding),
appears to have expanded O'Clair: "Multiple convictions and sentences for but one offense
of armed bank robbery constitute plain error of constitutional proportions." Id. at 1379. The
decision further departed from O'Clairby ordering an open court resentencing in addition to
vacating the sentences and conviction to insure that the court's serious misperception that
the defendant stood guilty of separate, independently serious crimes did not influence its
sentence determination. Id.
246. 96 S. Ct. 1023 (1976).
247. Id. at 1025-27.
248. 470 F.2d at 1204. Thus the jury first should consider the more serious count; if all
elements of the offense are proven it must convict on this count only. The jury will be
permitted to consider the lesser count only when it does not find sufficient evidence to convict
on the greater. Wright v. United States, 519 F.2d 13, 20 (7th Cir. 1975) and Butler v. United
States, 387 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (D.R.I. 1975) have expressly adopted this approach as well.
In Butler the court noted that the error of considering the counts separately and not seriatim
does not require a new trial nor subvert the jury's verdict as to the most serious offense. Id.
at 1379.
249. See, e.g., Gorman v. United States, 456 F.2d 1258, 1259 (2d Cir. 1972), describing as
"meritless" the claim that multiple convictions were improper. Notably, however, if it is
absolutely clear Congress did not intend for a defendant to be found guilty under both
sections (i.e. the mutually exclusive section (c) and another section of the Act) courts do
vacate convictions as well as sentences. See notes 88-108 supra & accompanying text.
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ple convictions without even considering the distinction between
multiple conviction and sentences.5 0 The post-Prince cases that
allow multiple convictions rely upon one of two basic premises: the
Act creates separate offenses for which but one penalty may be
imposed, or the Act defines a single offense with aggravated gradations for which punishment usually is imposed on the most aggravated. No difference has resulted in applying either of these interpretations. It would appear, however, that although the first properly can result in multiple convictions accompanied by only one
sentence, the second can support only a single sentence and conviction.
Those courts maintaining that the Act defines separate offenses
that may carry but one penalty' have manifested greater precision
in their language by specifying that a merger for sentencing purposes only and not a merger of offenses occurs252 because the subsections "retain their own identities" and are "separate and distinct
offenses however closely related." '5 3 These courts further assert that
Prince did not prohibit convicting the defendant of multiple offenses as charged in the indictment. 54 In contrast, the majority of cases
conclude that Prince merely precluded multiple sentences after declaring that the various subsections of the Act created a gradation
of different maximum punishments for a single offense-stealing
property from a federally-insured institution. 55 Yet it would appear
250. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 523 F.2d 253, 260 (2d Cir. 1975) (court merely
vacated multiple sentences); Jones v. United States, 396 F.2d 66, 69 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969) (only sentences vacated); United States v. Tarricone, 242 F.2d
555, 558 (2d Cir. 1957) (after expressly asserting that conviction under subsection (a) became
merged into conviction under (d), court held that merely sentences must be set aside); Kitts
v. United States, 243 F.2d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 1957) (upon multiple convictions under various
subsections only one sentence may be imposed). Additionally, courts generally use the term
"merger of offenses" without specifying whether a merger for purposes of sentencing only is
meant. Their subsequent action, however, in vacating not the conviction but only the sentence implies that this is the meaning assigned. See, e.g., United States v. Munn, 507 F.2d
563, 569 (10th Cir. 1974).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 347 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1965).
252. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 454 F.2d 286, 287 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Fried, 436 F.2d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158, 166 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 994 (1970); United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808, 811 (3d
Cir. 1969); Bayless v. United States, 347 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Poindexter, 293 F.2d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 961 (1961); United States
v. Trumblay, 286 F.2d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1961).
253. Matlock v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 398, 401 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
254. Id. But see the discussion of O'Clair,notes 226-48 supra & accompanying text.
255. See Goodman v. United States, 511 F.2d 706, 707 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Grant, 510 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gaddis, 506 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir.
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that if subsections (a), (b), and (d) merge into one substantive crime
for which only one sentence can be imposed, 2 multiple convictions
under these sections should be disallowed. The court in United
States v. White257 discounted this contention, however, asserting
that because these subsections, unlike subsection (c), do not contemplate different individuals performing mutually exclusive roles,
"[mlultiple convictions rendered [under them] against a single
defendant . . . are not inherently inconsistent, either factually or

legally, although cumulative penalties as a matter of statutory construction are impermissible.""'5 White's predication of multiple convictions on a distinction of subsection (c) is invalid. That one person
cannot be convicted of offenses "contemplat[ing] separate individuals performing entirely different roles" '59 does not establish conversely that merely because one person could enter a bank with the
requisite intent, consummate the robbery, and also commit assault
with a dangerous weapon, he should receive three separate convictions for each of these steps in the single transaction of bank robbery. The court's argument is weakened further by the fundamental
contradiction of first asserting that the subsections create "lesser or
1975). See also Sullivan v. United States, 485 F.2d 1352, 1353 (5th Cir. 1973) (Act "create[sl
but a single offense, with various degrees of aggravation permitting sentences of increasing
severity"); United States v. White, 440 F.2d 978, 982 (5th Cir. 1971) ("subsections ... simply
describe lesser or more aggravated forms of the same basic offense-stealing from a federallyinsured institution"); Eakes v. United States, 391 F.2d 287, 288 (5th Cir. 1968) ("subsections
create different maximum punishments for a single offense depending on whether aggravating
circumstances exist"). The Government conceded in Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301,
305 (1961), that the count charging a violation of (d) did not charge a separate offense. The
Supreme Court explained incorrectly, however, that "[tihis is not a case where sentence was
passed on two counts stating alternative means of committing one offense; rather, the third
count involved additional characteristics which made the offense an aggravated one
."Id. at 306.
256. See, e.g., United States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 696 (2d Cir. 1957). In United States
v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1974), the court stated incorrectly that each of
the circuits had concluded that Congress intended subsection (b) to merge into (a) and (a)
into (d) when the elements of a (d) violation are present so that there is only one offense and
may be only one sentence. Several courts have rejected the merger language in Prince, see
notes 55-56, 143-45 supra & accompanying text, to avoid the anomalous result of a lesser
punishment for the completed crime. Conflict exists as to whether the "single offense rule"
extends to section (e) as well. See notes 62-71 supra & accompanying text. Those circuits that
consider (e) a distinct offense hold it may support a separate sentence and conviction as well.
257. 440 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1971).
258. Id. at 982.
259. Id. The rationale for disallowing multiple convictions as well as sentences for subsection (c) and the other subsections appears to be their incompatibility rather than their
separateness, as evinced in the legislative intent to cover different individuals doing entirely
different things.
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more aggravated forms of the same basic offense""" and then declaring that the defendant was "merely convicted separately of overlapping offenses. "1
Moreover, those courts, as in White, that retained multiple convictions while vacating the accompanying sentences,"' failed to provide properly appealable convictions; because no sentences were
imposed the dangling convictions were not final. 3 A possible solution would be to apply the Corson general sentence to insure appealable multiple convictions for the single offense of bank robbery. This
appears undesirable, however, in view of the double jeopardy implications, the rule of lenity, and the high probability of adverse collateral consequences. The preferable approach, therefore, is that espoused in O'Clair and Gaddis, of indicting and sentencing so as to
-obtain only one sentence and one conviction." 4
THE FUTURE OF THE ACT

As evinced in the conflicting interpretations of the Federal Bank
Robbery Statute, in the prevalent imposition under the Act of incorrect sentences, and in the differing modes for disposing of such
illegal sentences, the present criminal code is difficult to apply consistently. The proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act of 197565 is
designed to replace the contradictory and chaotic criminal laws with
a systematic and comprehensive penal policy.6 Offenses consisting
of basically the same type of conduct have been consolidated to
260. Id. (emphasis supplied).
261. Id. (emphasis supplied).
262. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 504 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Pietras, 501 F.2d 182, 187-88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 660 (1974); Garza v. United
States, 498 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Parson, 452 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Foy, 441 F.2d 398, 399 (5th Cir. 1971).
263. But see United States v. Stewart, 523 F.2d 1263, 1264 (2d Cir. 1975), stating that
"[iln order to preserve for appeal convictions for violations of subsections (a) and (d) . . . "
this court has deemed it proper for the district court to enter simultaneous judgments ofconviction under both of these subsections," which implies that by simply imposing the
multiple convictions they are preserved for appeal. The court does not note that simultaneous
sentences under (a) and (d), whether concurrent or consecutive, are invalid. Cf. United States
v. Stevens, 521 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1975) (technically incorrect and admittedly untidy
disposition accepted as vindication of legislative intent).
264. See notes 287-97 infra & accompanying text.
265. S. 1, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
266. S. REP. No, 94-00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975). Basic features of the act include
integration of all felonies, elimination of obsolete or unusable sections, definition of recurrent
terms in order to avoid inconsistent and confusing constructions, and simple and uniform
drafting of offenses. Id. at 6-7.
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promote greater uniformity.2 "7 One means of achieving this standardization is by separating the basis for federal jurisdiction from the
elements of the offense; for example, defining the crime of robbery
per se, adding that the federal government may prosecute if a
federally-insured bank is robbed."' Another significant reform is the
adoption of restricted ancillary jurisdiction, allowing prosecution of
,particular common law offenses"' perpetrated by the defendant in
the course of committing the federal offense."" Under this approach
one could, for example, obtain separate convictions under separate
sections for murder,27 ' assault,27 2 kidnapping, 7 ' robbery, " and
267. Id. at 7.
268. Id. at 28-29. As maintained in Brown & Schwartz, New Federal Criminal Code Is
Submitted, 56 A.B.A.J. 844, 845 (1970): "Nothing has so distorted federal criminal law as
the habit of defining federal crimes in such a way as to make jurisdictional requirements
appear to be penologically significant elements of the offense." Id. at 845. In further explainng the development of federal auxiliary jurisdictions, the authors state: "Each new statute,
although dealing with the same misconduct, would incorporate an additional jurisdictional
base. Statutes passed at different times would carry different penalties for the same misconduct.
...
Id. at 846. Under the revised code, however, all offenses are defined in terms of
the substantive misbehavior. Id.
269. As explicated in S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 31 n.15 (1975): "The
characterization 'common-law offenses' is here used simply as a convenient means of reference to those offenses against persons or property that are usually considered malum in se. "
270. As observed in Note, Piggyback Jurisdictionin the Proposed Federal Criminal Code,
81 YALE L.J. 1209 (1972), this ancillary or piggyback provision has precedent in the Federal
Bank Robbery Act, under which the penalty of twenty years for a "basic" bank robbery may
be increased up to 25 years if assault occurs in the course of the bank robbery or up to life
imprisonment if death or kidnapping occurs. Id. at 1214-16. For descriptions of the expansive
general auxiliary jurisdiction as promulgated in the Commission Report see Brown &
Schwartz, New Federal Criminal Code Is Submitted, 56 A.B.A.J. 844 (1970); McClellan,
Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a Modern Federal Criminal Code, 1971
DUKE L.J. 663.

271. S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1601 (1975). An offense under this section
is graded as a Class A felony, carrying a possible death sentence. Id. at 548.
272. Id. at §§ 1611-18. The offenses included in the assault section are maiming (§ 1611),
aggravated battery (§ 1612), battery (§ 1613), menacing (§ 1614), terrorizing (§ 1615), communicating a threat (§ 1616), and reckless endangerment (§ 1617). These sections focus
principally on the nature of the actual injury caused or threatened rather than on the defendant's intent. Maiming, for example, is a Class C felony (up to 15 years in prison), reflecting
the view that crippling injuries resulting from intentional misuse of physical force deserve
severe punishment, id. at 558, whereas aggravated battery represents a Class D felony (up to
seven years). Id. at 559.
273. Id. at § 1621. An offense under this section is a Class A felony (up to life imprisonment) if the offender does not voluntarily release the victim alive and in a safe place prior to
trial; the offense is a Class C felony (up to 15 years in prison) in any other case. Id. at 583.
274. Id. at § 1721. An offense under this section is a Class C felony (up to 15 years in
prison). "Although less than the penalty under [the existing Bank Robbery Statute], the
provisions of the proposed Code relating to the use of a dangerous weapon in the course of an
offense (section 1823) and affording ancillary jurisdiction over violent felonies (e.g., murder
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theft"' committed during the course of a bank robbery. To illustrate: if a criminal robs a bank, assaults a teller, kidnaps the bank
president, and kills a security guard during the robbery, in most
circuits under the existing statute four convictions but only one
sentence would be allowed 2T-a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.277 The proposed act similarly would permit multiple convictions 7 ' and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.7 If a defendant were to rob a bank and assault two tellers with a dangerous
weapon, under the present statute he generally would receive three
convictions and a punishment of no more than twenty-five years,8 °
yet under the proposed act he well could receive five convictions"'
but a maximum sentence of only thirty years, for although consecutive sentences may be imposed,8 2 their length may not exceed the
(section 1601) and maiming (section 1611)) will permit aggregate penalties to be imposed in
appropriate circumstances." Id. at 641.
275. Id. at § 1731. An offense under this section is graded according to the amount taken
(over $100,000, Class C; $500 to $100,000, Class D) except in the case of certain items that
are always Class D felonies. Whereas a Class C felony can receive a penalty of up to fifteen
years, a Class D carries a maximum penalty of up to seven years. Id. at 688.
276. Those courts applying the concurrent sentence doctrine would allow concurrent sentences on the other counts to stand as well as long as one sentence was imposed validly. Under
the O'Clair approach, however, only one conviction would stand.
277. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1970). See note 2 supra.
278. It appears that convictions would be allowed for the robbery, the assault, the kidnapping and the murder, as well as possible additional convictions for carrying a dangerous
weapon and reckless endangerment.
279. S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2304 at 926 (1975). No punishment may
run consecutively with a life sentence-the longest term authorized. Id.
280. Most likely the three convictions would be for entering with intent to commit a felony
under (a), robbery under (a), and assault under (d). Notably, the proposed act does contain
a criminal entry statute (§ 1712), but unlike the Bank Robbery Act it does not cover entry
into a building during business hours, which is deemed consensual and thus not a crime. Such
an entry under the proposed act might be punishable as an attempt to commit the intended
offense (§ 1001) but would not be a completed offense in itself. S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 1712 at 625 (1975).
281. Theoretically, these convictions could be: one for robbery, one each for the assaults,
and one each for using a dangerous weapon in the course of the crimes (§ 1823). Furthermore,
although the prison terms added to the punishments for the underlying felonies under section
1823 (not less than one year or more than ten) are somewhat below those provided under the
present code, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1970), under the proposed code the offender also is likely
to be subject to a separable punishment under section 1617 for any actual endangerment of
life caused. See S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 831-34.
282. Although under the proposed law separate convictions and sentences may be imposed
under the various sections, section 2301 provides that multiple terms will run concurrently if
imposed at the same time unless the court orders otherwise. S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 2301 at 918-20 (1975). Consecutive sentences may not be imposed if, for example,
the offenses are for a parent offense and a lesser included offense, or a violation of a general
prohibition and a specific prohibition encompassed within it. In determining whether sen-
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term authorized for the class of offenses"8 3 one grade higher than the
most serious of which the offender had been found guilty. ' Apparently, therefore, the code generally will produce similar if not
harsher sentences for bank robbers and a greater number of convictions with the resultant collateral consequences.' Although passage
of some form of the criminal justice reform act appears likely, an
interim method for obviating the sentencing problems prevalent
under the present statute will be proposed.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Although the imposition of a general sentence may solve some of
the problems inherent in bank robbery cases decided under the
Prince rationale, a better solution would be for the Government to
charge the defendant, in a one-count indictment, with the highest
offense warranted by the facts of the case. The Government then
may rely on Rule 31(c) 8' of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
to secure a conviction on a lesser included offense should the evitences are to run consecutively the court must consider the need for just punishment, deterrent effect, rehabilitation, and the nature of both the offense and the offender.
283. Under S.1 there are nine classes of offenses including five felony classes with authorized terms of imprisonment ranging from three years to life. The terms set forth (i.e., Class
D up to seven years, Class C up to 15 years, Class B up to 30 years) are the maximum periods
authorized and are only to be imposed under the most egregious of circumstances. S. REP.
No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2301 at 918 (1975).
284. Id. § 2304 at 925-26 (1975). In the example, bank robbery is a Class C felony with a
maximum penalty of 15 years, the two assaults (unless maiming results) and the use of a
dangerous weapon are Class D felonies with possible penalties of up to seven years each.
Rather than multiplying seven years by the number of Class D convictions and adding 15
years for the Class C felony, for a possible total of 43 years, this section provides that the
maximum available sentence would be that authorized for a Class B felony-30 years. This
approach is praised in Brown & Schwartz, Sentencing Under the Draft Federal Code, 56
A.B.A.J. 935, 937-40 (1970) and Carraway, Sentencing Reform in Multiple Offense Cases:
Judicial and Legislative Avenues, 7 CONN. L. REv. 257, 282-86 (1974).
285. See notes 210-13 and note 238 supra & accompanying text. In designating as "harsher"
the approach taken by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Law, the
court in O'Clairapparently considered not only the possibly longer term of imprisonment but
also the greater number of convictions. The designation of offenses referred to in O'Clairwas
followed closely in the proposed act except for the addition of a three year felony and a six
month misdemeanor. S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2301 at 918 (1975). The
provision that multiple consecutive sentences shall be treated as a single sentence for purposes of establishing parole eligibility has obviated somewhat one of the adverse effects of
multiple convictions. Id. § 2304 at 924.
286. "The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense
charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily
included therein if the attempt is an offense." FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (c).

154

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:101

dence adduced at trial prove insufficient to support a conviction on
the offense charged." 7
A one-count indictment, however, presupposes that the lesser offense for which the defendant also may be convicted under the Act
and for which the jury should be given appropriate instructions2"' is
a lesser included offense of the greater offense charged. Unfortunately, the phrase "necessarily included offense," as used in Rule
31(c), has not been defined comprehensively by any federal court.2 9
Most courts, confronted with the question of the scope of "necessarily included offenses,"290 have adopted a restrictive definition requiring that for a lesser offense to be necessarily included, it must
be impossible to commit the greater offense without also commit287. The doctrine permitting the jury to find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense
necessarily included in the one charged "developed at common law to aid the prosecution in
cases where the proof failed to show some element of the crime charged." 2 C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 515 at 372 (1969). The First Circuit implicitly supports
this one-count indictment procedure. See O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199, 1204 (1st
Cir. 1972). See note 299 infra.
288. "There is no doubt but that defendant is entitled to an instruction about the lesser
offense as a matter of right if the evidence would permit the jury to find him guilty of that
offense." 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 287, § 498 at 337.
289. 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 31.03[2], at 31-11 (2d ed. 1975). Moore finds three
basic variants of the necessarily included offense. The first arises when it is impossible to
commit the greater without also committing the lesser offense (i.e., robbery and larceny) and
may be called necessarily included as a matter of law. Id. at 31-12. The second occurs when
the lesser offense is "presumptively necessarily included within the offense charged in the
indictment." Id. Entry with intent to commit a felony and robbery provides an example of
this type. The greater offense of bank robbery presumptively includes the lesser offense of
entering the bank with felonious intent, but the evidence adduced at trial may show that the
defendant formed his intent to commit robbery after he entered the bank. The third variant
of the necessarily included offense arises when the various offenses "do not share the same
elements of proof, but [their] relationship in a particular case might justify a defense request
for a lesser-offense instruction." Id. The example given by Moore is that of burglary-larceny.
A conviction for burglary requires a finding of an intent on the defendant's part to commit
an offense within the premises entered; although the intended offense in the majority of cases
is larceny, it need not be. Id. at 31-13. The closest analogy to this variant of necessarily
included offenses under the Bank Robbery Act would be aggravated assault under (d) and
killing under (e), assuming arguendo that (d) requires the use of a dangerous weapon. A
dangerous weapon is usually used in a killing or kidnapping under (e), but it need not be.
290. There is a distinction between "necessarily included offense" and "lesser included
offense," although the two phrases are used interchangeably by the courts. Olais-Castro v.
United States, 416 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1969). "The former denotes a relationship which
always exists between the two offense categories, such as larceny and robbery, regardless of
the facts of a particular case. The latter depends upon particular facts." Id. at 1157 n.3,
quoting from 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 31.03 (2d ed. 1965). Olais-Castrostated that
Rule 31(c) was recognized as including both types of offenses, but failed to cite any authority
to support this proposition. 416 F.2d at 1157.
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ting the lesser."' One defect in this strict interpretation is that it
would preclude the jury from finding a defendant guilty of entering
a bank with intent to commit a felony upon an indictment charging
only robbery of the bank. Because a bank robber possibly may formulate the requisite felonious intent after entering the bank, the
entry provision of (a) cannot be considered, under such a harsh
interpretation, a lesser included offense of robbery. Additionally, in
those circuits holding that subsection (d) requires the use of a dangerous weapon, (d) could not be considered a lesser included offense
of (e) inasmuch as both killing and kidnapping may be committed
without such weapons.
Increasing dissatisfaction with this limited interpretation of lesser
included offenses has culminated in efforts to weaken its stringent
requirements. The American Law Institute"' and, more recently,
291. See, e.g., Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1120 (1969) (lesser included offense is one necessarily established by proof of the greater
offense); Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1969) (lesser offense must be
such that it is impossible to commit the greater without first committing the lesser). See
generally Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections on the Neal
Doctrine, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 357 (1970); Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double
Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949). This definition of necessarily included offenses is also the
one successfully propounded by the Government at the trial court level, and later rejected
by the appellate court, in United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The
Government blocked jury instructions to the effect that the defendant, charged with first
degree burglary, could be found guilty of the lesser included offense of unlawful entry. It
argued that for an offense to be included necessarily in another, "its theoretical elements all
must be identically reflected in the theoretical elements of the greater." Id. at 316. Because
burglary could be committed in certain circumstances by means of a lawful entry, the Government urged that unlawful entry could not be considered a lesser included offense thereof.
Id.
A California District Court of Appeals, in People v. Whitlow, 113 Cal. App. 2d 804, 249
P.2d 35 (1952), summarized very clearly this interpretation of lesser included offenses:
[Blefore a lesser offense can be said to constitute a necessary part of a greater
offense, all the legal ingredients of the corpus delicti of the lesser offense must
be included in the elements of the greater offense. It therefore follows that if an
element necessary to establish the corpus delicti of the lesser offense is irrelevant
to the proof of the greater offense, the lesser cannot be held to be a necessarily
included offense.
Id. at __ , 249 P.2d at 37. It is clear error, under such a definition of necessarily included
offenses, to state that the offense of assaulting and putting lives in jeopardy by the use of a
dangerous weapon (subsection (d)) necessarily includes the offense of entering a bank with
felonious intent (subsection (a)), as did the court in United States v. Nelson, 160 F. Supp.
881, 882 (D.N.H. 1955).
292. The American Law Institute has defined an offense as included when:
(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense charged or
to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
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the District of Columbia Circuit 93 have adopted a definition of
lesser included offense that does not require a mechanical comparison of the elements of the two offenses to determine if one is necessarily included in the other. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals has concluded that merely because one crime possibly
could be committed without necessarily committing the lesser
crime, such a possibility should not prevent application of the doctrine as long as the proof adduced at trial established the commission of the lesser, as well as the greater, offense.294 Furthermore, to
find that one offense necessarily is included in the other, the two
must be so related that proof of the lesser almost always is presented
upon proof of the greater.2"5
Use of this definition would allow a lesser included offense instruction to be given for any offense charged under the Bank Robbery Statute (with the exception of subsection (c)) because it solves
the problems presented by those subsections of the Act that usually,
but not invariably, are included in the "higher" offense. Similarly,
that portion of the Model Penal Code that defines an offense as
included when "it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person,
property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to
establish its commission,""29 also can be employed in bank robbery
cases to justify instructions on lesser included offenses. Under this
broad definition of lesser included offenses, all offenses defined in
section 2113 (with the exception of (c)) would be considered lesser
included offenses of subsection (e), the most aggravated offense
defined in the Act.
(c) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious
injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser
kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.
Model Penal Code § 1.07(4) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, in defining lesser included offenses, adopted this wording
of the American Law Institute. Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws, § 703 at 59 (1971).
293. See United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Fuller v. United
States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1227-29 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
294. United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court observed
that Supreme Court language on the subject of lesser included offenses "speaks both of 'the
crime charged' and 'the evidence.' "Id. at 319. "In a case where some of the elements of the
crime charged themselves constitute a lesser crime, the defendant, if the evidence justified
it, would no doubt be entitled to an instruction which would permit a finding of guilt of the
lesser offense." Id. at 317, quoting from Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 134 (1956).
295. Id. at 319.
296. Model Penal Code § 1.07(4)(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

1.976]

BANK ROBBERY ACT

The charging of the defendant in a one-count indictment, with its
concomitant instructing of the jury as to lesser included offenses,
requires that the charge in the indictment give the defendant fair
notice that he may be called on to defend against all lesser included
offenses." 7 Thus the question remains whether a defendant charged
with kidnapping to avoid apprehension, for example, is adequately
notified that he may have to defend against a possible charge of
jeopardizing lives with a dangerous weapon or of entering a bank
with felonious intent. The answer to this question probably always
will be affirmative; yet the niggling doubt that occasionally may
arise suggests that an alternative method of charging the defendant
would be the multi-count indictment, thus obviating any possibility
that the defendant will not be apprised of all charges he may have
to defend against.
O'Clair5 5 advocated the multi-count approach. To avoid multiple
convictions whenever a defendant is charged under such a multicount indictment,299 that court suggested that the trial judge instruct the jury to consider first the most serious offense charged. If
it finds the defendant guilty of such offense, it should convict on
that offense alone; a response to the lesser offense charged is unnecessary.300 Should the jury find the defendant innocent of the greater
offense, it should acquit him thereof and make a finding as to his
30
guilt on the lesser offense charged. '
This method of instructing the jury necessitates arrangement of
the offenses delineated in the Act in descending order of gravity. As
297. United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
298. 470 F.2d 1199 (lst Cir. 1972).
299. O'Clair made clear that its holding did not prevent the filing of a multi-count indictment, though it indicated that a one-count indictment would be "adequate for purposes of
clarity and notice to the defendant ....
" Id. at 1204. The court relied on Fifth Circuit
practice, as illustrated by Prince v. United States, 230 F.2d 568, 571 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd,
352 U.S. 322 (1957), as supportive of this proposition. Prince,however, does not raise the issue
of the sufficiency of a one-count indictment.
300. O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199, 1204 (1st Cir. 1972). The generally accepted
rule, providing that in multi-count cases the jury should return a separate verdict as to each
count in order to avoid retrial as to all counts should error be found requiring reversal as to
one count, id. at 1204, is a technical violation of Prince. Each separate count on which the
defendant is found guilty requires a sentence in order to impart finality to the judgment, see
United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 549 (3d Cir. 1971), and separate sentences, even
probated ones, would be disallowed under a strict interpretation of Prince. Id. at 549-50.
301. 470 F.2d at 1204. The District of Columbia Circuit endorsed this procedure in Fuller
v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (unrelated to bank robbery).
It is the same procedure the Supreme Court recently espoused in United States v. Gaddis,
96 S. Ct. 1023, 1027 (1976), for situations involving subsection (c) of the Act.
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the crimes of killing and kidnapping in the course of the robbery
unquestionably are the most aggravated, the jury should consider
them first. Although a split of authority exists as to whether subsection (e) defines more than one offense, 0° it is suggested that if the
indictment charges a violation of subsection (e), the jury first should
determine whether the defendant is guilty of type [3] killing or
kidnapping. If the jury finds him so guilty, it should return a verdict
on that count alone.30 3 If the jury acquits the defendant of type [3]
killing or kidnapping, it then should consider type [2] and then
type [1] killing or kidnapping. If the jury acquits the defendant of
all subsection (e) charges, it should consider the remaining offenses
in the following order: aggravated robbery (d); robbery (a); larceny
(b); and receiving and possessing (c). Although subsection (c) and
the other subsections of the Act are "mutually exclusive, ' 30 4 (c) may
be considered the least "aggravated" of the offenses under this proposed method of instructing the jury; because no danger exists that
a defendant will be convicted for both robbing and receiving, (c)
need be treated no differently than the other subsections. It is submitted that such instructions will remedy most of the problems
encountered under the Act 303 by thus insuring consistency and uniformity in the sentencing and indicting of accused bank robbers.
302. See notes 60-71 supra & accompanying text.
303. See notes 106-08 supra & accompanying text. That the defendant is guilty of type [1]
or [2] killing or kidnapping as well would be treated no differently than when there are
multiple victims under any other subsection of the Act.
304. See notes 88-92 supra & accompanying text.
305. If, under these proposed instructions, a defendant should claim he is entitled to a
verdict on every count charged, utilization of the prevailing "untidy" approach of allowing
multiple convictions with a sentence imposed on but one of the convictions, see notes 249-58
supra & accompanying text, might be required.

